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I. INTRODUCTION 
A hallmark of the American precedent-based legal system is 
consistency.  From jurisdiction to jurisdiction, state court to federal court, 
legal doctrines built upon the foundation of historic precedent are 
generally applied with uniform—or at least recognizably similar—rules 
and guidelines, leading to predictable results.1  That is, unless the subject 
is waiver of arbitration rights. 
Under what circumstances does a party involved in litigation waive 
the right to enforce a valid arbitration agreement?  Why does it—or should 
it—matter if the plaintiff asserts class-action claims?  And what may 
prompt a court to revive previously waived arbitral rights?  Those three 
questions at the heart of this article are seemingly straightforward.  But the 
answers to them are anything but. 
In the United States, arbitration is increasingly used to resolve disputes 
in many diverse areas, including those involving consumer, commercial, 
anti-trust, securities, foreign investments and employment law.2  This 
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1.    See, e.g., Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the Waste 
Land’s Legal System, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127, 130 (1995) (“The modern stare decisis system is 
designed to produce a consistency of result and a similar outcome in fact patterns that are identical or 
nearly so.”). 
 2.   See generally BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 572 U.S. 25 (2014) (dispute under 
international treaty); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (antitrust 
dispute); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (applying FAA to employment 
contract); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
(international sales agreement and antitrust dispute); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 
(1974) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violation); see also WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 701–02 (2d ed. 2012) (describing foreign investment 
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growth was fueled in part by U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning in 
1983 that amplified the scope and impact of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA).3  The expanded use of arbitration agreements4 has also created new 
                                                          
arbitration). 
 3.   See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27 (2017) 
(rejecting state rule that subjected the formation of arbitration agreements to a higher standard as 
inconsistent with the FAA); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (“[California’s 
interpretation] does not give ‘due regard . . . to the federal policy favoring arbitration.’  Thus, the Court 
of Appeal’s interpretation is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989))); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding that the application of state 
unconscionability principles to arbitration clauses waiving class action was invalidated by the FAA); 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding an Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act claim can be subjected to compulsory arbitration under the FAA); Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (permitting arbitration of claims under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (enforcing an arbitration 
agreement concerning claims under the Sherman Act); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.”). 
 4.   Some members of the media, academics and judges disagree concerning the proper scope 
and interpretation of the FAA, particularly in the employment and consumer law areas.  See S. 2838, 
The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act: J. Hearing on S. 2838 Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary & the Spec. Comm. 
on Aging, 110th Cong. 12–17 (2008) (statement of Stephen Ware, Professor, University of Kansas 
School of Law) (opposing a bill banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements for nursing home 
residents); Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 696–
700 (2001) (describing critiques of arbitration); Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, 
“Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 955, 955–65 (2014) (examining the extent to which companies have included arbitral class 
waivers in consumer contracts following two Supreme Court cases permitting these waivers); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to 
Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1317–22 (2015) (describing Supreme 
Court decisions expanding use of arbitration agreements in employment settings and predicting 
employers will rely on these decisions to defeat employee class actions); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & 
Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-
of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/7G3J-C6BT]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Efforts 
to Rein In Arbitration Come Under Well-Financed Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/business/dealbook/efforts-to-rein-in-arbitration-come-under-
well-financed-attack.html [https://perma.cc/B42U-8GAE]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael 
Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-
system.html [https://perma.cc/3H8P-R2J3]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule on 
Arbitration Would Restore Right to Sue Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/business/dealbook/consumer-agency-moves-to-assert-bank-
customers-right-to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/F28Q-UMR2]; Jed S. Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your 
Day in Court, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/ 
11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/9FYH-QNGC]; Anonymous, Opinion, 
Washington’s Arbitration Deception, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2016, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/washingtons-arbitration-deception-1463526580 [https://perma.cc/T9CE-MMYU].  Much of 
the disagreement seems to stem from differing understandings of the genesis of the FAA, its purpose, 
and from related policy concerns regarding the impact of arbitration versus litigation on the parties. 
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situations in which parties may be found to have waived their arbitral 
rights.  Moreover, the increased frequency of class and other aggregate 
litigation has created issues involving arbitration agreements and the rights 
of putative class members.  As Supreme Court decisions continue to shape 
the contours of arbitral rights, the circumstances of waiver 
correspondingly evolve with the availability of arbitration and the use of 
class-action waivers.5 
Waiver, which we explore in depth below, generally occurs when a 
party voluntarily and knowingly relinquishes a right.  But, in litigation 
involving contractual arbitration provisions, assessing waiver typically 
involves an examination of the extent to which a party, by pursuing or 
defending a court action, acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate.  
And, the existence of prejudice to the opposing party may also be a 
decisive factor.6 
An important side-effect of the shifting waiver landscape is the 
opportunity for revival of the right to arbitrate following certain 
circumstances of waiver.  For many decades courts have grappled with 
when a party has waived or was “in default” of its right to arbitrate.7 
But the enforceability of a contract is not static.  Whether in alimony, 
real estate, or any number of other settings, changed circumstances or 
changed conditions may necessitate a fresh review of the scope of 
contractual rights and whether a previously waived right has been revived.  
Increasingly, the same is true in arbitration.  In fact, arbitration agreements 
are not mere contracts.  They are agreements that are supported by the 
policy flowing from the FAA, favoring resolution of disputes through 
arbitration.8  Increasingly, courts rely on that policy to revive the right to 
                                                          
 5.   See cases cited supra note 3 and infra note 283. 
 6.   See Thomas J. Lilly, Jr., Participation in Litigation as a Waiver of the Contractual Right to 
Arbitrate: Toward a Unified Theory, 92 NEB. L. REV. 86, 100–12 (2013) (discussing different factors 
and approaches the courts of appeals use to determine whether a party has waived its right to 
arbitration). 
 7.   See Kahnweiler v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 67 F. 483 (8th Cir. 1895) (holding that by 
filing suit instead of submitting dispute to arbitrators, as contemplated by the insurance contract, the 
parties waived their right to arbitration).  After passage of the FAA some courts referred to the Act’s 
“default” language in § 3.  A default was generally viewed by the courts as a waiver.  See, e.g., 
Middlesex Cty. v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53, 56 n.2 (1st Cir. 1971) (referring to the “default” 
provision of 9 U.S.C. § 3); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 412 (2d 
Cir. 1959) (“Lawrence asserts that Devonshire has waived its right to arbitrate or was ‘in default in 
proceeding with such arbitration’ under Section 3 of the Act.”); Am. Locomotive Co. v. Chem. 
Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115, 121 (6th Cir. 1948) (“[T]he delay on appellant’s part in moving for a 
stay was unreasonable and unexcusable under all the circumstances and constituted ‘default’ on its 
part in proceeding with the arbitration.”). 
 8.   See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, 
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
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arbitrate a claim even where waiver might have previously made 
arbitration unavailable. 
There was a time when the prevailing notion was that “[o]nce the right 
to arbitrate a particular dispute has been lost by an election to litigate it 
[could not] be recaptured.”9  But that paradigm has shifted through three-
plus decades and with marked frequency in the past several years.  No 
longer does a party to an arbitration agreement waive its enforcement once 
and for all by participating in litigation for a certain period.  A burgeoning 
body of case law, emphasizing the fairness of waiver, futility, aggregate 
action complications and revival, reflects that in any given case, waiver 
may be a nuanced conclusion that can change over time.  After all, when 
litigation takes an unforeseen left turn, “fairness dictates that a defendant’s 
prior waiver of arbitration be nullified and the right to compel arbitration 
revived.”10 
In this article, we explore the developing body of waiver and revival 
case law to outline its contours, which hinge, in part, on notions of fairness 
to each party with respect to the arbitration agreement.  In Part II, we 
briefly review the murky history of arbitral waiver—when and why it 
occurs.  Part III examines the varying standards governing waiver 
throughout the country, detailing the different approaches to waiver that 
affect arbitral rights by jurisdiction.  Part III also examines the application 
of the waiver doctrine in aggregate litigation.  Indeed, the right to arbitrate 
claims in the class action context, and the extent to which that right has 
been waived or not, is particularly complex and subject to different 
approaches in different jurisdictions.  No area deserves clear, meaningful 
standards more than in dealing with waiver issues in the class action 
environment.  Yet, what exists is disturbing ambiguity.  A party may not 
realize that an arbitration right is waived until a court says so.  And that 
finding could have disastrous economic consequences. 
This background is essential to understanding the components of a 
revived arbitral right, or when courts have found no original waiver as to 
a particular claim due to the futility of originally seeking arbitration or 
because of the class action context of a case.  We explore these 
multifaceted issues in Part IV.  There, we analyze the cases that have 
                                                          
favor of arbitration . . . .”); Republic Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 
2004) (noting a “strong presumption against finding a waiver of arbitration” (citing Subway Equip. 
Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999))). 
 9.   Sherrill v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 772, 777 (N.Y. 1985). 
 10.   Plaintiff’s Shareholders Corp. v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 486 F. App’x 786, 790 (11th 
Cir. 2012); see also Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A] 
defendant’s waiver of the right to compel arbitration is not automatically nullified by the plaintiff’s 
filing of an amended complaint” (citing Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d 
Cir. 1987))). 
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accepted or rejected the existence of revival and isolate the relevant details 
that inform the results.  Following in Part V, we provide our conclusion 
on the general state of waiver and revival law and its impact on the 
resolution of claims in many areas of law.  We also explain the 
significance of the futility and revival doctrines where uncertainty 
underlies the potential enforcement of certain arbitration agreements 
specifically in class or aggregate action settings. 
II. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION BEGINS WITH THE WAIVER 
A. The Foundation of the Waiver Doctrine 
The history of waiver, of course, begins with an understanding of the 
history of arbitration, which reaches further back than the origins of the 
English common law,11 with roots that can be traced to Roman and Canon 
law.12  Arbitration generally enjoyed widespread use and favorable 
treatment in early English common law for several reasons, including the 
                                                          
 11.   MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2.1–2.3 (2016) 
(discussing the origins of arbitration and its use in ancient Greece and Rome); Julius Henry Cohen & 
Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1926) (“The use of 
arbitration dates back to the earliest days of which we have historical knowledge.  It furnished almost 
exclusively the tribunals for the settlement of business disputes in the medieval period, and in England 
up to Lord Mansfield’s day was practically the sole remedy open to English merchants.”). 
 12.   Peter J. Smith IV, Investors Win: Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Makes Entering 
Arbitration Quicker, Easier, and Less Expensive, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 127, 128 (2003).  The use 
of arbitration was prevalent in English religious guilds with early records indicating these guilds had 
codified arbitration agreements by at least 1388.  DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 
IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ENGLAND 1154–1558 220–21 (2013) (describing a writ issued by Richard II of 
England in 1388 requiring religious guilds to submit a copy of their rules).  Evidence exists that 
Merchant and craft guilds similarly codified arbitration provisions by 1348.  Id. at 226–27 (noting a 
1348 ordinance of the Oxford Barbers guild requiring members to submit disputes to the guild for 
resolution).  See also William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into The History Of The Adjudication Of 
Mercantile Disputes In Great Britain And The United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 447–50 (1958) 
(discussing the establishment of separate mercantile tribunals in England as early as 1100).  Arbitration 
was also used to settle disputes within religious groups, including the Jewish community in England 
and the Christian church.  ROEBUCK, supra at 235, 286.  Women also played a role in early English 
arbitration, though female arbitrators were rare and of high rank.  Id. at 275–77.  History shows 
widespread use and codification of arbitration in the 1100s.  Arbitration in England included instances 
both where parties freely elected to use arbitration and where the court ordered parties into arbitration.  
See generally id. at 53–65 (discussing court-ordered arbitration as well as the parties’ ability to submit 
their disputes to arbitration); James Oldham, The Historically Shifting Sands of Reasons to Arbitrate, 
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 41, 41 (2016) (describing the opportunity to select an arbitrator and the 
confidentiality of arbitration as aspects of the practice); Margo Todd, ‘For Eschewing of Trouble and 
Exorbitant Expense’: Arbitration in the Early Modern British Isles, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 16 (2016) 
(“[J]udges in all kinds of courts were by all accounts happy to refer cases to arbitrators . . . .”); but see 
Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598 (1928) (“[I]n the 
early common law, arbitration was entirely a matter of private arrangement for which there was no 
authority except the personal authority of the parties to the agreement . . . .”). 
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economic benefits of arbitration,13 expertise brought by arbitrators,14 and 
the business or trade knowledge that arbitrators could bring that would be 
beyond the realm of litigation.15 
Yet, many believe that in the 1600s, the English courts’ attitude 
shifted, essentially becoming hostile.16  This shift has been attributed to 
Lord Coke’s 1609 decision in Vynior’s Case, which has been called “the 
original and controling [sic] authority for revocability” of arbitration 
agreements.17  Due to Lord Coke’s apparent distaste for arbitration 
                                                          
 13.   Oldham, supra note 12, at 42–43; Smith, supra note 12, at 128 (noting that courts were slow 
and therefore expensive); Todd, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
 14.   Cohen & Dayton, supra note 11, at 278 (“Before Lord Mansfield’s day the courts of England 
were ignorant of the manner in which they should treat questions respecting the buying and selling of 
goods or marine insurance or promissory notes, or, indeed, any mercantile question.”); Bruce H. Mann, 
The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
443, 470 (1984); Oldham, supra note 12, at 48–53; Smith, supra note 12, at 128 (noting merchants 
and guilds believed courts lacked adequate knowledge of trade disputes). 
 15.   Mann, supra note 14, at 454–55 (describing how arbitrators in colonial Connecticut were 
often from the same town as the disputants, unlike jurors who were selected on a colony-wide basis, 
and therefore could craft solutions so the parties could continue to live civilly in the same community); 
Todd, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that arbitrators, who were selected from the local community, often 
knew the parties involved, the history of the disagreement, and could address the origins of a dispute); 
see also JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 69 (Thomas A. Green 
et al. eds., 2004) (“There are over three hundred cases in Lord Mansfield’s trial notes that were referred 
to arbitration in lieu of a jury verdict.”); JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE 
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 152 & nn.403–05, app. E (Thomas A. Green 
ed., 1992) (first listing the names of a few arbitrators, their occupations, and the cases they arbitrated, 
and then collecting Lord Mansfield’s cases from 1756–1786 in which arbitrators were used and listing 
the names and occupations of those arbitrators); Jones, supra note 12, at 456 (“Another indication of 
the popularity of arbitration is the inclusion of forms for arbitration agreements and awards in form 
books and manuals designed for tradesmen and their clerks.”); Oldham, supra note 12, at 42 
(“Arbitrament is much esteemed and greatly favoured in our Common Law . . . to prevent the great 
Trouble and frequent Expense of Law-suits.” (quoting AUTHOR OF REGULA PLACITANDI, ARBITRIUM 
REDIVIVUM: OR THE LAW OF ARBITRATION (London, Isaac Cleeve 1694)). 
 16.   DOMKE, supra note 11, at § 2.5 & n.4; Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some 
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 582–83 (1952) (“[I]n a case like this, involving the [FAA], we should not 
follow English or other decisions which have narrowly construed the terms of arbitration agreements 
or arbitration statutes.” (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 
985 (2d Cir. 1942))). 
 17.   Sayre, supra note 12, at 602; but see Philip G. Phillips, A General Introduction, 83 U. PA. 
L. REV. 119, 123–24 (1934) (questioning Vynior’s impact on business behavior); Sayre, supra note 
12, at 601–02 (noting judges did not immediately come to rely on Vynior’s Case for upholding the 
revocability of arbitration agreements); Todd, supra note 12, at 16–17 (“Since [English] judges in all 
kinds of courts were by all accounts happy to refer cases to arbitrators, what happened in the early 
modern period to lead later students of dispute resolution to the quite false presumption that arbitration 
was always extra-judicial, and that the courts were enemies of the process?  The culprit seems to be a 
misunderstanding of Robert Vynior’s case, an action brought to the Court of Common Pleas in 1609 
against William Wilde for his failure to pay a bond of £20 ordered by arbitrators to resolve a dispute 
over ‘divers kinds of parish business.’ . . . Many modern jurists seem to consider this case as the legal 
origin of non-binding arbitration; they apparently see common law courts as jealous of the alternative 
path to resolution.  Coke, however, needs to be read with more attention to his own historical 
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agreements which ousted the courts,18 judicial hostility towards arbitration 
is said to stem from “the perception that the agreements allowed parties to 
circumvent the court’s jurisdiction.”19 
Early American colonists brought from England the practices of 
mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes.20  Consequently, arbitration 
was commonly used throughout early America.21  However, as the 
common law developed in the United States, the “jealousy of the . . . 
courts for their own jurisdiction” increased.22  Following what they 
understood as English precedent, American courts were reluctant to lend 
their authority to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.23  To combat 
this hostility and the presumption of revocability—where either party 
could withdraw from an arbitration agreement at any time without the fear 
of damages24—New York passed the New York Arbitration Act of 1920.25  
                                                          
context.”); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 
132, 138–44 (1934) (analyzing the reasoning of Vynior’s Case, arguing it was correctly decided based 
on the case’s specific facts and applicable law, and describing subsequent English cases expanding the 
revocability of arbitration agreements). 
 18.   DOMKE, supra note 11, at § 2.5. 
 19.   Id. at § 6.1. 
 20.   Derek Roebuck, The English Inheritance—What the First American Colonists Knew of 
Mediation and Arbitration, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 325, 328–29 (2016) (“Th[e] exportation [of 
mediation to early America] included not only the practice of mediation and arbitration to resolve 
disputes, but also the high value placed on those dispute resolution processes by individuals and 
entities as varied as individual colonists and the Privy Council.”); see also Jones, supra note 12, at 460 
(“[Colonial] merchants used at one time or another every type of court available in the colony to settle 
their disputes, and from time to time they devised new forms for their own use. . . . The New York 
Merchants also used private voluntary arbitration.”); Mann, supra note 14, at 447 (“Along with other 
legal traditions, arbitration was part of the cultural baggage of the trans-Atlantic migration.”).  
 21.   Mann, supra note 14, at 452 (colonial Connecticut and Massachusetts); Roebuck, supra note 
20, at 347 (noting an early Maryland arbitration case).   
 22.   Smith, supra note 12, at 130 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)). 
 23.   Cohen & Dayton, supra note 11, at 283 (“For many centuries there has been established a 
rule, rooted originally in the jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by their 
agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the courts.  This rule was so firmly established that our American 
courts did not feel themselves free to change the rule, but declared it to be the duty of the legislature 
to make this change.”). 
 24.   Smith, supra note 12, at 129. 
 25.   Section 1448 of the New York Civil Practice Act provided that the contract “shall be valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”  N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 1448.  It has since been replaced by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 
(McKinney 2013).  For a comparison of the language of the 1920 New York Arbitration Act to various 
contemporaneous state arbitration acts, see WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS § 27 (1930).  The New York City Chamber of Commerce played a large 
role in the passage of the New York Arbitration Act and later the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  
Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration and Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural 
Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2943, 2949–50 (2015) (discussing the role and motives of various groups 
interested in procedural reform that led to the New York act, but noting that both acts “were the product 
of a massive educational and lobbying campaign that was initiated by . . . [the] head of the New York 
Chamber of Commerce’s Committee on Arbitration” who later joined forces with the New York Bar 
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This legislation sought to “avoid the procedural intricacies . . . of . . . 
litigation” while promoting “a commercially reasonable and 
knowledgeable dispute resolution process.”26  In other words, businesses 
could rely on the arbitration agreements they executed. 
The contractual nature of arbitration agreements played a prominent 
role in the early waiver cases, but equitable considerations lurked in the 
background.  The initial focus on contract law and the underlying 
circumstances is perhaps best reflected in the 1933 Second Circuit case 
Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc.27  A brief 
explanation of the procedural details in Krauss illustrates the complex 
considerations in play regarding waiver.  In Krauss, the merchant parties 
initially orally agreed to the sale of thousands of feet of small timbers.28  
In an “Order Acknowledgement,” the plaintiff seller detailed the terms of 
the sale and included an arbitration clause.29  The Order added that unless 
the defendant buyer notified the plaintiff seller to the contrary, it was final 
and binding.30  The defendant buyer did not object and accepted the timber 
delivery.31  After the defendant buyer failed to pay, the plaintiff seller sued 
in state court for the purchase price.32  The defendant buyer filed an 
answer, a counterclaim and also raised the arbitration clause.33  The 
plaintiff seller replied to the counterclaim, and both parties served notice 
of trial.34  After unsuccessfully moving for voluntary dismissal, the 
plaintiff seller sent defendant a letter accepting the defendant buyer’s offer 
to arbitrate as pled in the answer.35  The defendant buyer refused to 
arbitrate and the plaintiff seller instituted an action in federal court to 
enforce the arbitral agreement.  The district court compelled arbitration, 
                                                          
Association’s Committee on the Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation); see also Carbonneau, supra 
note 21, at 245 (noting the relationship between New York’s Arbitration Act and the FAA). 
 26.   Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 245 n.47 (citing Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of 
Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 268 (1988)); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, 
Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 
141, 147 (2016) (“In the decades leading up to the enactment of the FAA, the courts were widely 
perceived as unable to deliver substantial justice.  Crippling delays and mounting backlogs made it 
difficult for claims to be adjudicated on their merits in a timely fashion.  Even when they were, the 
resulting decision according to the law often did not reflect the layperson’s sense of what was right.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 27.   62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933). 
 28.   Id. at 1005. 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Id. 
 31.   Id. 
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   Id. 
2018 SEARCHING FOR CLARITY AMID CONFUSION 335 
and the defendant buyer appealed,36 arguing that the plaintiff seller had 
forfeited arbitration by bringing an action in state court.37 
In analyzing the circumstances in which a party forfeits its right to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, Judge Learned Hand noted that “[t]he 
question [of waiver] is one of contract only, for the [FAA] does not impose 
any condition upon the remedy, presupposing that it merely enforces the 
promise to submit controversies to arbitration.”38  If the court sought only 
to consider the nature of the offer and acceptance under contract law, the 
analysis would have ended when Judge Hand found that the defendant 
“could not prevent the plaintiff’s resumption of the remedy, while its own 
position remained unchanged.”39  But while the Second Circuit 
characterized waiver as a question of contract only, the court nevertheless 
recognized that the “rights of the parties are measured by equitable 
considerations, [which] prevent a party from playing fast and loose with 
his adversary.”40  Furthermore, the Second Circuit demonstrated its 
reluctance to find waiver based solely on participation in the litigation 
under the FAA, relying on a defendant’s willingness to submit to 
arbitration, as demonstrated through its answer and moving affidavits, as 
sufficient to retain the right to arbitrate.41 
Some commentators rely on the contractually-based language of early 
                                                          
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id. at 1006. 
 38.   Id. 
 39.   Id. 
 40.   Id. at 1007.  A recent Tenth Circuit opinion analyzed the Krauss Bros. decision as not 
applying a bright-line rule on waiver: “The [Krauss Bros.] case turned on the defendants’ offer to 
arbitrate . . . but it shows that the Second Circuit considers the circumstances presented rather than 
applying a bright-line rule against plaintiffs who later request arbitration.”  BOSC, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs, 853 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 41.   Krauss Bros. Lumber Co., 62 F.2d at 1006–07; see also Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. 
Westchester Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1934) (defendant not in ‘default’ when in its answer 
and moving affidavits it expressed its “willingness to submit to arbitration”), aff’d on other grounds, 
293 U.S. 449 (1935).  The court also applied equitable considerations in The Belize v. Steamship 
Owners Operating Co., 25 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).  There, plaintiff sued defendant for allegedly 
damaging a vessel owned by the plaintiff.  Id. at 664.  The defendant submitted an answer and did not 
invoke the arbitration clause that existed in the parties’ underlying contract.  The defendant also 
submitted interrogatories to which the plaintiff responded.  Later, the plaintiff moved to stay the 
proceedings and sought to enforce the arbitration agreement.  In denying plaintiff’s motion, the court 
acknowledged that the arbitration clause was binding and enforceable on both the plaintiff and 
defendant, and that the parties waived arbitration by their conduct.  Id.  The court remarked: “This 
conclusion is unavoidable on the law of contracts.  It is also supported by practical consideration.”  Id.  
The court concluded that “there comes a time in the course of the litigation when it would be unfair to 
permit one side to resort to arbitration over the protest of the other.  That time is reached when the 
defendant files an answer on the merits, joining with the plaintiff in rejecting arbitration and tendering 
the controversy to the court for trial.”  Id.  In The Belize, the court used contractual principles to inform 
its conclusion but also considered fairness to the parties.  
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judicial opinions to maintain that waiver decisions were entirely premised 
on contract principles.42  Courts, however, also used the rubric of contract 
law to structure their equitable analyses.  In the arbitration context, courts 
have found that waiver occurs when the plaintiff brings a claim and the 
defendant participates in the litigation.43  Early courts were quick to state 
that they were relying on contractual principles to determine whether a 
party had waived its right to arbitrate.  Yet, the analysis rarely ended with 
understanding whether there was offer and acceptance to waive the 
arbitration agreements; courts frequently considered equitable type issues 
such as delay and the impact of conduct on adversaries in conjunction with 
their contractual analysis.44 
Prior to formalized arbitration law, some of the earliest cases 
involving the agreement to arbitrate did appear to rest on contractual 
principles.  For example, in People v. Court of Common Pleas, 
Onondaga,45 the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York denied 
defendant’s motion for mandamus in which defendant sought to set aside 
a verdict favoring plaintiff in a slander suit.46  Defendant sought that result 
because the case had initially been submitted to arbitration and litigation 
was discontinued.47  However, arbitration never resolved the issue because 
one of the arbitrators could not attend.48  The court ultimately found that 
the defendant had waived the right to arbitrate “by the defendent’s [sic] 
counsel appearing on the trial, cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses, 
and addressing the jury.”49  So, not unexpectedly, participation on behalf 
of the defendant in trial was sufficient to constitute waiver.50  This 
                                                          
 42.   For a discussion of the waiver approaches, see Robert B. Martin, Waiver of the Right to 
Compel Arbitration—A Directional Analysis, 16 CAL. W. L. REV. 375, 388–94 (1980).  
 43.   Krauss Bros. Lumber Co., 62 F.2d at 1006 (“The state action was indeed a repudiation of 
the plaintiff’s own promise to arbitrate; it gave the defendant an election . . . to put an end to the 
arbitration clause . . . . By its plea in the answer it chose [to arbitrate].” (citing Hosiery Mfrs.’ Corp. 
v. Goldston, 143 N.E. 779 (N.Y. 1924))); Zimmerman v. Cohen, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (N.Y. 1923) 
(“[T]he plaintiffs made their election [to settle their disputes through litigation instead of arbitration] 
when they brought their action against the defendant ignoring the agreement to arbitrate.  The 
defendant made his election when he answered . . . .”). 
 44.   See, e.g., Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938) 
(holding the defendant waived its right to arbitration by waiting to assert that right until the day of the 
trial); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co., 62 F.2d at 1006; The Belize, 25 F. Supp. at 664; In re Bauer Co. v. 
Anderson Chem. Co., 206 A.D. 423, 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (finding waiver when the defendant 
waited three years after filing a complaint and notice of trial before seeking to compel arbitration). 
 45.   1 Wend. 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828). 
 46.   Id. at 314–15. 
 47.   Id. at 314. 
 48.   Id. 
 49.   Id. at 315. 
 50.   Similarly, in Laflin v. Chicago, W. & N. Railway Co., 34 F. 859 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1887), the 
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held the presence of an arbitration agreement did 
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rationale was extended in Harrison v. German-American Fire Insurance 
Co.51 where a federal court held that “[t]here must be . . . no action which 
is inconsistent with the right to rigidly insist on an award” taken by the 
defendant, “else that right is waived.”52 
But the threshold focus on contract appears to have shifted in 
Kahnweiler v. Phenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn.53  The court in 
Kahnweiler addressed the fairness of the pleadings on both parties when 
discussing the contract containing the arbitration agreement, finding that 
“when a defendant relies upon a breach of a condition precedent . . . he 
must set out specifically the condition and the breach, so that the plaintiff 
and the court will be advised of the issue to be tried.”54  In finding that the 
defendant waived the right to demand arbitration, the court applied such 
equitable considerations as the expense and delay that failure to detail the 
breach of condition precedent would entail.55 
Equitable considerations continued to be the basis of the New York 
                                                          
not preclude litigation, and, alternatively, the parties waived their right to arbitrate.  In Laflin, the 
defendant constructed a railroad in close proximity to plaintiff’s hotel.  Id. at 859.  Plaintiff sued 
alleging that defendant’s railroad would have an injurious effect upon plaintiff’s hotel business.  Id.  
Subsequent to the commencement of the lawsuit, the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.  Id. 
at 859–60.  On appeal, the court held that the mere making of an agreement to submit a controversy 
to arbitration does not absolutely discontinue any pending suit.  Id. at 864.  The court further reasoned 
that even if its conclusion was wrong, the “discontinuance has been waived by the acts and conduct 
of the defendant in proceeding to a trial of the case and contesting it upon the merits.”  Id.  And in 
Chamberlin v. Hibbard, 38 P. 437 (Or. 1894), the court found waiver when a party’s answer did not 
request enforcement of an arbitration agreement.  Chamberlin involved a construction contract 
dispute.  Id. at 437.  The parties entered into a construction agreement which provided that if any 
dispute arose involving the value of completed work, the parties would submit the dispute to an 
umpire, whose decision would be binding on the parties.  Id. at 438.  After the defendant allegedly 
defaulted on the amount due, the plaintiff instituted a foreclosure action.  Id. at 437.  The plaintiff did 
not attach a copy of the original contract to his complaint.  Id. at 438.  While the defendant included a 
copy of the contract in his answer, he failed to plead its arbitration provision.  Id.  The Oregon Supreme 
Court found that defendant waived his right to have an arbitrator value the completed work by pleading 
to the merits in his answer and not raising the arbitration provisions.  Id. 
 51.   67 F. 577 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1895). 
 52.   Id. at 582.  Harrison also discusses condition precedent, which is outside the scope of this 
article. 
 53.   67 F. 483 (8th Cir. 1895). 
 54.   Id. at 485; see also W. Assurance Co. of Toronto v. Decker, 98 F. 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1899) 
(finding that if neither party demands arbitration, they have both waived it (quoting Kahnweiler, 67 F. 
at 488)). 
 55.   Kahnweiler, 67 F. at 486–87 (“By failing to set [forth the arbitration requirement] and its 
breach in its answer, the defendant waived that defense.  If the rule were otherwise, a degree of 
uncertainty would be introduced in the practice in this class of cases much greater even than that which 
obtained under the general issue at common law.  It would be a snare and a pitfall, and neither the 
plaintiff nor the court would have any knowledge of the issue to be tried.”); see also Hiltl Co. v. 
Bischoff, 198 N.Y.S. 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (mem.) (reversing lower court and finding no waiver 
before trial where defendant served an answer containing a counterclaim and the case was noticed for 
trial). 
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high court’s waiver decisions, as illustrated by Hosiery Manufacturers’ 
Corp. v. Goldston.56  The Hosiery court affirmed the reversal of the trial 
court, which previously held that the defendant waived its right to arbitrate 
merely by filing its answer.57  In concluding there was no waiver, the court 
acknowledged that although the defendant participated in the litigation to 
some extent by filing an answer, it did not waive the right to arbitrate 
because it asserted that right in its answer.58  The court also underscored 
the equitable principles embraced by New York’s Arbitration Law by 
comparing it to the English Arbitration Act.  The court noted that while 
the English Act contained a limitation under which a party must invoke 
the right to arbitrate before delivering a pleading, the New York 
Arbitration Law contained no similar limitation.59 
After Congress enacted the FAA, federal courts were prompted to 
consider the question of waiver.  Initially, “early commentaries and 
decisions under the Act assumed that no equitable discretion could be 
exercised” so courts “engaged in strained and technical interpretations of 
the clauses before them.”60  Because the FAA was based largely on the 
New York Arbitration Law, many aspects of the common law waiver 
doctrine developed under the New York Act initially influenced the 
federal courts’ reasoning.61  In the 1930s, courts began to turn to principles 
of equity to support their findings.62 
As the case law developed, the interconnected relationship between 
                                                          
 56.   143 N.E. 779 (N.Y. 1924); see also Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 150 N.E. 614, 614 
(N.Y. 1926) (per curiam) (“[U]nreasonable delay in making the proper application may justify a 
finding of waiver” because New York’s “Arbitration Law contemplates prompt action, and too long a 
delay in seeking appropriate relief may be easily construed as an indication that this claim is waived.”). 
 57.   Hosiery, 143 N.E. at 780. 
 58.   Id.; but see The Belize v. Steamship Owners Operating Co., 25 F. Supp. 663, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 
1938) (“The libellant in its libel tried to reserve the right to resort to arbitration at a later time.  The 
attempted reservation was futile. . . . But where there is knowledge of the necessary facts on which to 
found a choice of inconsistent remedies, an asserted reservation of the right to take the inconsistent 
remedy later on is of no avail.” (citation omitted)). 
 59.   Hosiery, 143 N.E. at 780. 
 60.   Comment, Judicial Exercise of Equitable Discretion in Enforcement of Arbitration 
Contracts, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (1954).  For example, in Young v. Crescent Development Co., 
148 N.E. 510, 510–11 (N.Y. 1925), the court determined that a dispute arising from the 
nonperformance of a contract did not fall under the contract, so the arbitration clause did not apply. 
 61.   See Alessandra Rose Johnson, Note, Oh, Won’t you Stay with Me?: Determining Whether § 
3 of the FAA Requires a Stay in Light of Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2266 
(2016) (noting that since the FAA mirrors the New York Act in some respects, New York decisions 
interpreting the state law are at the very least persuasive). 
 62.   Comment, Judicial Exercise of Equitable Discretion in Enforcement of Arbitration 
Contracts, supra note 60, at 721 (“In the 1930’s, however, the federal courts began turning to 
principles of equity to achieve their results, and highly technical grounds for refusing enforcement 
were not so often relied upon.”). 
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equitable and contract principles continued to evolve.  In Almacenes 
Fernandez, S. A. v. Golodetz,63 plaintiffs brought suit alleging that 
containers used in shipping caustic soda were “dented, rusted and unfit for 
shipment,” leading to damages.64  In its answer, Golodetz denied most of 
the allegations in the complaint and set forth a counterclaim asserting the 
arbitration agreement.65  Within six months, Golodetz “caused seven third 
party defendants to be joined” in the action.66  At the end of that six-month 
period, Golodetz “moved for an order staying the action” and requiring 
arbitration.67  In considering whether Golodetz waived its right to arbitrate, 
the court noted that where a defendant asserts a counterclaim on the merits, 
“[its] conduct in so doing may amount to a waiver which will bind them 
both.”68  However, even waiting several months (or until the eve of trial) 
before requesting arbitration does not divest a party of that right as “the 
trial judge has discretion to deny the application of a party thus in 
default.”69  Even so, “delay in moving for an arbitration order will not 
alone amount to a default.”70 
The history of the waiver of arbitration agreements does not present a 
singular or easily articulated standard to determine when a party waived 
                                                          
 63.   148 F.2d 625 (2d. Cir. 1945). 
 64.   Id. at 626. 
 65.   Id. at 627. 
 66.   Id. 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Id. at 627 (emphasis added) (citing Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 
128 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1942)).  In Galion, the court determined that plaintiff, in electing to pursue 
litigation, had waived its right to submit to arbitration under the contract; when defendant submitted 
an answer on the merits, it also waived its right to submit to arbitration.  128 F.2d at 413.  See also La 
Nacional Platanera, S.C.L. v. N. Am. Fruit & S.S. Corp., 84 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1936) (“Under a 
reasonable construction of [the FAA] the District Court was vested with discretion to deny the prayer 
for the reference of the dispute to arbitrators as well as to refuse to stay the suit if he considered 
plaintiff was in default in proceeding with the arbitration.  We have no hesitancy in deciding that by 
bringing the action at law to recover damages, ignoring the provisions of the charter party for 
arbitration, and then delaying for nearly four years before attempting to invoke arbitration, plaintiff 
was so much in default that he was not entitled to demand arbitration.”). 
 69.   Almacenes Fernandez, S. A., 148 F.2d at 627 (citing Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 
Inc., 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938)).  In Cannon Mills, where a stay of the trial was sought by defendant 
under the FAA, the court stated “[t]he trial judge is vested with discretion to refuse to stay the action 
if he is of the opinion that the party seeking arbitration is in default.”  97 F.2d at 318–19.  The court 
ultimately found “[b]y setting up a counterclaim for damages the defendant . . . expressly invoked” 
the court’s jurisdiction.  Id. at 319.  Moreover, “[t]he cases relied upon on behalf of the defendant are 
all cases in which there was no dilatoriness or unexplained delay on the part of the party seeking 
arbitration.”  Id. at 320. 
 70.   Almacenes Fernandez, S. A., 148 F.2d at 628; see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg 
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 980, 989 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding that a defendant who had waited to 
assert his right to arbitrate until nine months after the lawsuit was initiated had not waived that right 
because “no important intervening steps had been taken in the suit and no one had been affected by 
the delay”). 
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the right to arbitrate.  But a common thread running through the early cases 
suggests an interplay of equitable and contractual considerations.  While 
many of the cases discussed contractual aspects of waiver—such as the 
election, or offer, that one party makes to litigate, rather than arbitrate, and 
the election of the other party, or acceptance of that offer—the legal 
analysis went further to consider the equity of finding waiver at that point 
in the proceedings, often looking to expense, delay, or prejudice.  In that 
respect, the considerations laid down by the early cases are still reflected 
in today’s disparate waiver standards. 
B. What Has Changed in the Legal Environment? 
The legal environment has changed considerably since the elements 
of waiver were first contemplated.  That change has given rise to many of 
the issues with which modern courts must now contend.  Indeed, early 
decisions involving arbitration were not required to confront many of the 
“revival” issues currently based on the amendment of complaints or class-
related waiver problems.  There are several possible explanations for this 
absence. 
First, amending complaints to add claims or expand damages was 
difficult before 1938.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted 
in 1938.71  The rules brought the right to liberally amend pleadings, which 
did not previously exist.72 
Second, modern Rule 23 class actions did not exist until 1966.73  A 
                                                          
 71.   Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the 
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (1989). 
 72.   See generally Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, 
24 A.B.A. J. 97 (1938) (describing the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules 
Enabling Act); Weinstein, supra note 71, at 1906, 1913–17 (discussing the underlying ethos of the 
rules and commenting on proposed amendments).  
 73.   Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating the effective date of Rule 23 was July 1, 1966).  See 28 U.S.C. 
App. § IV, r. 23 (1964 & Supp. II); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: 
Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588, 603–09 (2013) (describing the drafting 
history of Rule 23 and how subsequent events set the stage for an expansive use of the rule); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The Ironic History of Rule 23 2–4 (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 17-41, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3020306 [https://perma.cc/P2X6-FDDU] (discussing how Rule 23’s class action mechanics could 
encompass a much larger class of plaintiffs and, contrary to the 1938 version of the provision, adopted 
an opt-out provision).  Much of the recent increase in federal court class actions may be due to the 
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which made removal of class actions to 
federal court substantially easier for class defendants.  See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact 
on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1610 (2008) (“CAFA has increased not only the 
number of class action removals to federal court, but also the number of class action original filings 
in federal court.”); Gail E. Lees et al., Year in Review on Class Actions: 2011 a Blockbuster Year for 
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number of the waiver and “revival” decisions involve class actions filed 
after that date or the court’s jurisdiction over putative class members.74 
Third, collective wage and hour actions did not exist until 1938 and 
were not in their present form until 1947.  On June 25, 1938, President 
Franklin Roosevelt signed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which 
became effective October 24, 1938.75  Congress amended Section 16(b) of 
the FLSA in 1947 in response to a wave of wage and hour representative 
litigation in the manufacturing sector.76  With the amendments, “the 
representative action by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims was 
abolished, and the requirement that an employee file a written consent [the 
opt-in request] was added.”77  Despite the 1947 amendments, FLSA 
collective actions now are one of the more frequently filed types of 
employment-related aggregate litigation claims in the U.S.78 
Fourth, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have driven many of the revival 
or “futility” decisions discussed in this article.  Supreme Court decisions 
such as Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon (agreements to 
arbitrate Securities Exchange Act claims enforceable under the FAA)79 
                                                          
Litigators, Highlighted by Supreme Court Rulings in Dukes and Concepcion, 13 Class Action Litig. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 225 (Feb. 24, 2012) (noting a “massive increase” in class action filings following 
CAFA, and that “[C]onsumer class action filings increased by 577% in the district courts in the Ninth 
Circuit!”). 
 74.   See discussion infra Sections III.C–D. 
 75.   John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 464, 473 (1939); Leah Avey, Note, Walk to the Line, Compensable Time: Cash in the Pockets 
of Employees, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 135, 137 (2007). 
 76.   See, e.g., Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 515–17 (2014) 
(discussing the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947); see also 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (explaining that the amendment had 
“the purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own right 
and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions” (citing various sections of the Portal-
to-Portal Act)); Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 62 n.1 (1953) (explaining that 
the amendments reflected a Congressional view that the FLSA had “been interpreted judicially in 
disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, 
thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities” (quoting the Portal-to-Portal Act § 1(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
251(a) (2012))).  
 77.   Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173 (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 538, 2182 (1947) (remarks of 
Sen. Donnell regarding the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947)).  The Act amended section 16(b) of the 
FLSA to include “No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent 
in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”  
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87–88 (1947) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 216) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231). 
 78.   See Robert Teachout, Fewer Wage and Hour Class Actions Filed, But Value of Settlements 
Spikes, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesand 
tools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/class-action-wage-and-hour-2016.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/P8GH-BG6L] (citing the results of the Seyfarth Shaw 2016 annual report, which attributes 
the popularity of filing wage and hour cases to the relatively low cost to justify class certification). 
 79.   482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
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and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (class action waivers within 
arbitration provisions subject to the FAA are enforceable)80 were catalysts 
for change.  These decisions overruled or revised earlier Supreme Court 
or state court precedent that placed restrictions on arbitration, belatedly 
enabling some cases to be resolved by arbitration. 
Finally, the impact of the “prejudice” requirement for waiver or to 
defeat revival after a change in law, regardless of how long the case may 
have been pending in court, has led to further judicial scrutiny and 
analysis.81  Irrespective of the cause, courts are now confronted with more 
waiver, futility and revival issues than in the first 50 years of the FAA. 
III. THE STANDARDS FOR WAIVER DIFFER SUBSTANTIALLY BY 
JURISDICTION. 
As its history reflects, the waiver doctrine in arbitration is neither 
uniform in application nor connected in linear fashion.  The absence of a 
single test for waiver has led to a variety of standards that vary from one 
jurisdiction to another.  Understanding the application of waiver in any 
given court, of course, is a prerequisite to later raising the issue of revival 
should circumstances warrant.  Indeed, the seeds of revival often 
germinate depending on a court’s view of the equity underlying the initial 
waiver or the abruptness of a change of legal course in a case.  And, in 
some special situations, a court may conclude that no waiver occurred at 
all. 
At the outset of a case, particular circumstances may delay a party’s 
filing of a motion to compel arbitration and instead lead to a decision to 
participate in the ongoing litigation.  Participating in litigation, however, 
carries the risk that the party will be found to have waived the right to later 
pursue arbitration for the same claim. 
The choice to remain on the litigation path, which may occur once or 
several times in a single case, has far-reaching effects on both parties’ 
eventual ability to access arbitration.  For the party seeking it, prior 
participation in litigation can block the road to arbitration, notwithstanding 
the FAA’s policy in favor of arbitration.  Conversely, without clear 
guidance on exactly what constitutes waiver, a party resisting arbitration 
but actively engaged in litigation with a party seeking arbitration may lack 
certainty about an opponent’s ultimate ability to secure arbitration.  The 
                                                          
 80.   563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 81.   See Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that a party’s 
inconsistent actions do not necessarily constitute prejudice for waiver purposes); see also Erdman Co. 
v. Phoenix Land & Acquisition, LLC, 650 F.3d 1115, 1120 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Carcich as the 
origin of the prejudice requirement). 
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magnitude of these concerns varies with the jurisdiction and the facts of 
any given case. 
Yet, these concerns are hardly academic.  In 2011, a party in In re 
Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Marketing, Sales, Practices & Products 
Liability Litigation that failed to seek to compel arbitration, believing it 
was not legally available, was later found to have waived the right.82  That 
waiver, the district court held, prevented the defendant from later seeking 
arbitration through revival, even though a change in the law clarified that 
arbitration was possible.83  Although perhaps more of a story about revival 
than waiver standards, the illustration is important because had the 
circumstances occurred in a different jurisdiction, say the Third Circuit,84 
it is unlikely that the court would have construed waiver ever to have 
occurred.  The futility of moving to compel arbitration prior to a change 
in the law would have negated any waiver.  And absent waiver, the right 
to compel arbitration would have been clear. 
So understanding waiver—why, when and how it manifests—is 
central to an analysis of revival.  Whether waiver occurs in the first 
instance, however, can be a complicated question.  To be sure, most courts 
base a waiver analysis on a party’s participation in litigation in a manner 
that is inconsistent with arbitrating a claim.85  That is, if it looks like a 
party pursuing litigation is acting like a party engaged in litigation, it is 
probably an active litigant who is not adequately preserving arbitral rights.  
But what looks like participation in litigation to one court may just be 
ancillary conduct to another.  These differences underscore the reason 
standards for assessing waiver vary from federal circuit to circuit and from 
state to state.  Indeed, what amounts to waiver in a federal court in East St. 
Louis, Illinois86—within the Seventh Circuit where prejudice is not 
required87—may not qualify as waiver across the Mississippi River 
                                                          
 82.   828 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that the defendant knew it could compel 
arbitration as a defense because it raised that right as an affirmative defense before the change in the 
law). 
 83.   Id. at 1163–65. 
 84.   See, e.g., Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[F]utility can 
excuse the delayed invocation of the defense of arbitration.”). 
 85.   See generally Lilly, supra note 6, at 100–12 (noting that although circuit courts differ 
regarding whether demonstrating prejudice, and to what degree prejudice must be demonstrated, is a 
necessary condition of finding waiver, waiver is justified because litigation is inconsistent with 
arbitration). 
 86.   A courthouse for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois is 
located at 750 Missouri Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois.  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, https://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/Directory.aspx [https://perma.cc/XR 
8P-JWTC] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018). 
 87.   Lilly, supra note 6, at 107. 
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approximately three miles away at the federal courthouse in St. Louis, 
Missouri88—within the Eighth Circuit where prejudice is a component of 
waiver.89  A showing of prejudice to the opposing party may be required 
in Dallas (Fifth Circuit)90 but not in Denver (Tenth Circuit).91  No two 
federal appellate jurisdictions are exactly alike when addressing these 
issues.92 
On one end of the spectrum, the Fifth Circuit applies a “presumption 
against waiver,” which leaves the party resisting arbitration with a “heavy 
burden” to show waiver.93  At the opposite end, the Seventh Circuit does 
not even require a showing of prejudice to the party advocating waiver.94  
In between is a muddled picture of varying standards with which different 
courts analyze different elements of participation in litigation differently.  
What most evaluate in the end, however, is whether the party asserting 
waiver was prejudiced—and the extent to which it matters.95  But as one 
court explained regarding the opacity of the case law on waiver and 
prejudice, “A Nordic smorgasbord of United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals decisions greets us on the subject of prejudice for purposes of 
arbitration waiver.”96  Because a party’s right to revival may depend on 
how or why waiver occurred and the extent to which prejudice is involved, 
understanding the implications of waiver in various jurisdictions is 
essential to analyzing revival. 
                                                          
 88.   A courthouse for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri is 
located at 111 South 10th Street, St. Louis, Missouri.  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, http://www.moep.uscourts.gov/division/thomas-f-eagleton-us-
courthouse [https://perma.cc/SGV4-NV49] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).  Driving Directions from 750 
Missouri Avenue, East St. Louis, IL to 111 South 10th Street, St. Louis, MO, GOOGLE MAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps (follow “Directions” hyperlink; enter “750 Missouri Avenue, East St. 
Louis, Illinois” in the starting point field and “111 South 10th Street, St. Louis, Missouri” in the 
destination field). 
 89.   Lilly, supra note 6, at 106 & n.141. 
 90.   Id. at 103–04. 
 91.   Id. at 107–08. 
 92.   Id. at 102–11 (describing different approaches taken by different circuits). 
 93.   Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Keytrade 
USA, Inc. v. Ain Temouchent M/V, 404 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting the “well-settled rule 
in this circuit that waiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it” 
(quoting Steel Warehouse Co. v. Abalone Shipping Ltd. of Nicosai, 141 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1998))). 
 94.   See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text. 
 95.   See Lilly, supra note 6, at 102–12.  In his article, Professor Lilly defines four broad 
categories of courts vis-à-vis waiver: those that require a “heavy burden” to show prejudice; those that 
require a “modicum of prejudice”; those that are somewhere in between “heavy burden” and 
“modicum”; and those that require no prejudice at all. 
 96.   Schuster v. Prestige Senior Mgmt., L.L.C., 376 P.3d 412, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
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A. Seventh and Fifth Circuit: The Polar (Presumption) Opposites and 
the Search—or Not—for Prejudice 
The lack of both a unified waiver theory and bright-line test has 
produced a confusing situation in which courts apply their own views 
regardless of positions taken by neighboring jurisdictions.  No two courts 
appear more sharply divided, however, than the Seventh and Fifth Circuits.  
In the Fifth Circuit, the presumption against waiver routinely leaves parties 
unable to establish the required prejudice to demonstrate waiver and 
preclude enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.  The polar opposite of 
the Fifth Circuit’s “presumption against waiver” is the Seventh Circuit’s 
position that participating in litigation is “a presumptive waiver of the right 
to arbitrate.”97  These opposing tests reflect the divergent views that each 
court holds of what amounts to “waiver.” 
“Waiver consists of a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right.”98  In the contractual setting, which would include arbitration 
agreements, a contract “requirement cannot be suddenly revived to the 
prejudice of a party who has changed his position in reliance on the 
supposed suspension [of the waived contract term.]”99  That is, both the 
instance of waiver by the party choosing to participate in litigation and the 
detrimental reliance on that waiver by the party opposing arbitration may 
be assessed in determining whether waiver of the right to arbitrate 
occurred.100 
When courts consider detrimental reliance in the arbitral waiver 
context, they frequently refer to it as “prejudice.”101  Most, but not all of 
them, require some showing of prejudice, or reliance, by the opposing 
party before concluding that a party seeking arbitration waived its right to 
do so.  On the other hand, as observed below, the Seventh Circuit typifies 
those jurisdictions that hold prejudice is unnecessary to find waiver. 
The Seventh Circuit takes a purely contractual approach to waiver, 
which it explains is no different than analyzing waiver of any other 
contract right.102  Indeed, within the footprint of the Seventh Circuit, the 
                                                          
 97.   Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 98.   Cherokee Nation v. United States, 355 F.2d 945, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
 99.   Gresham & Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 542, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 
 100.   As a recent state court explained, federal courts have conflated the two concepts of waiver 
and reliance into a single waiver analysis.  Schuster, 376 P.3d at 420–21 (noting that principles of both 
waiver and estoppel, or reliance, should apply but that “[f]or some unknown reason, federal courts 
employ only waiver when addressing unenforceability of an arbitration clause”). 
 101.   See supra note 98.  
 102.   St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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FAA’s policy favoring arbitration is instead “merely a policy of treating 
such clauses no less hospitably than other contractual provisions.”103  In 
that regard, parties can modify the agreements through their conduct, and 
choosing a non-arbitral litigation forum—by failing to move to compel 
arbitration at the earliest possible moment—will be deemed a waiver of 
the right to later pursue arbitration.104  The court explained this in its 1995 
opinion Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc. when 
it held that a party who removed a case to federal court without 
immediately moving to compel arbitration indicated its intent to pursue 
litigation.105  As Judge Posner forcefully articulated in Cabinetree, 
“Parties know how important it is to settle on a forum at the earliest 
possible opportunity, and the failure of either of them to move promptly 
for arbitration is powerful evidence that they made their election—against 
arbitration.”106 
Once the presumptive waiver doctrine is applied, as it is from the 
earliest stages of litigation in the Seventh Circuit, any search for prejudice 
to the party resisting arbitration is largely beside the point because the 
contractual nature of the dispute controls the result.107 
At the other end of the waiver spectrum is the Fifth Circuit, where 
“prejudice . . . is the essence of waiver.”108  There, decisions recite that the 
FAA policy favoring arbitration109—not principles of contract law—
                                                          
 103.   Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390 (citing St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 969 F.2d 585).  As construed by the 
St. Mary’s court, “the federal policy embodied in the Arbitration Act is a policy favoring enforcement 
of contracts, not a preference for arbitration over litigation.”  969 F.2d at 590. 
 104.   See Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 390–91 (describing the filing of a law suit in lieu of arbitration 
as a “presumptive waiver”).  See also Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc., 304 F.3d 
753, 756–58 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming waiver where party seeking arbitration lacked diligence in 
“mak[ing] the earliest feasible determination of whether to proceed judicially or by arbitration” 
(quoting Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391)). 
 105.   Cabinetree, 50 F.3d at 391. 
 106.   Id. 
 107.   Id. at 390 (“To establish a waiver of the contractual right to arbitrate, a party need not show 
that it would be prejudiced if the stay were granted and arbitration ensued.” (citing St. Mary’s Med. 
Ctr., 969 F.2d 585)). 
 108.   E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 559 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
 109.   Federal policy favoring arbitration can be found within Section 2 of the FAA which provides 
that “(a) written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  The policy was enacted in the 1925 passage 
of the FAA to “reverse[] an entrenched common law hostility towards arbitration.”  David F. Sawrie, 
Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of Federal Arbitration Law: The Alabama 
Supreme Court’s Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 721, 723 (1998).  See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 
of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration . . . .”).  But see Rita M. 
Cain, Preemption of State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, 
19 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 11–13 (1993) (arguing that the policy favoring arbitration was “strictly a 
2018 SEARCHING FOR CLARITY AMID CONFUSION 347 
requires a “strong presumption against finding a waiver of arbitration,”110 
even when a party pursues arbitration after years of court litigation and is 
mere months from trial.111 
Indeed, in the Fifth Circuit, “[a] party waives its right to arbitration 
only when participation in the litigation has been so substantial that 
compelling arbitration would prejudice the other party.”112  This varying 
treatment reflects that in the Seventh Circuit, the primacy of contract 
trumps statute (the FAA); in the Fifth Circuit, the opposite is true. 
Simply put, in the Fifth Circuit, the right to arbitrate is more than 
contractual, at least compared to the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of 
“contractual.”  It is not enough to merely participate in litigation in the 
Fifth Circuit, even after engaging in extensive discovery, and thereby 
“waive” the contractual right to arbitrate.  Routine litigation practice is 
unlikely to result in waiver in the Fifth Circuit where the heavy burden of 
proof remains with the party opposing arbitration.113  To cross the line into 
conduct that is “so substantial” that litigation participation prejudices the 
party opposing arbitration, the litigation conduct must reflect unfairness, 
if not deviousness.  Where the Fifth Circuit has found prejudice, it tends 
to be manifested in the form of a party seeking more than one bite of the 
proverbial apple—unsuccessful pursuit of a dispositive motion followed 
by a motion to compel arbitration.114  In that sense, equity—not contract 
                                                          
judicially created policy” because Congress merely intended the FAA to enforce arbitration 
agreements between business entities). 
 110.   Republic Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F.3d 324, 326 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 111.   Elite Precision Fabricators, Inc. v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., No. H-14-2086, 2015 
WL 9302843, at *1, *13 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2015) (holding no waiver where defendant did not move 
to compel until more than a year had passed, after a stay was lifted, and the defendant asserted the 
motion to compel arbitration in conjunction with a motion to dismiss).  On the other hand, when a 
party first files an unsuccessful motion to dismiss and then follows that with a motion to compel 
arbitration, prejudice, and ultimately waiver, may be found. 
 112.   Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. SEA PHOENIX MV, 325 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 113.   Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int’l, AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 1985) (“While it is 
true that Davy waited almost eight months before moving that the district court proceedings be stayed 
pending arbitration, and, in the meantime, participated in discovery, this and other courts have allowed 
such actions as well as considerably more activity without finding that a party has waived a contractual 
right to arbitrate.”). 
 114.   See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 613 F.3d 584, 591 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A party cannot keep its 
right to demand arbitration in reserve indefinitely while it pursues a decision on the merits before the 
district court.”).  But in Pacheco v. PCM Construction Services, L.L.C., 602 F. App’x 945 (5th Cir. 
2015), the Fifth Circuit considered waiver issues in the FLSA collective action context.  There PCM 
Construction Services (PCM) had moved to compel arbitration after a thirteen-month delay.  Id. at 
946–47.  In those thirteen months, PCM had filed two motions to dismiss and would file a third one 
after submitting its motion to compel arbitration, id. at 947, but the appellate court discounted those 
actions because they were “relatively limited” and “[o]nce a defendant has put the plaintiff on notice 
of its intent to demand arbitration, the plaintiff’s burden of showing waiver by subsequent acts of the 
348 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
principles—determines waiver. 
Most of the waiver standards articulated and refined by other courts 
can be traced to one of these extremes.  Often, particularly at the state-
court level, judges seeking guidance can do little more than cite to the split, 
throw their hands up and pick a side. 
B. The Muddled Middle Ground of Waiver Analysis 
Between the extremes of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, courts can 
largely be labeled by how closely they hew to either side.  Some, such as 
the Fourth and the Tenth Circuits, line up closely to one of the extremes.  
Others occupy the large swath of middle ground where conclusions are not 
easily drawn. 
The Fourth Circuit, for instance, aligns with the Fifth Circuit in 
rejecting a pure participation-in-litigation standard.115  Instead, “the 
dispositive question is whether the party objecting to arbitration has 
suffered actual prejudice.”116  Even aggressive participation in litigation 
may not rise to the level of waiver if the claims subject to arbitration are 
not connected to any prejudice.117  Like the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the 
Ninth Circuit will not easily arrive at a waiver conclusion— “waiver of 
                                                          
defendant is heavier.”  Id. at 948.  The court discounted PCM’s third motion to dismiss since it was 
filed after its motion to compel.  Id.  And its prior motions to dismiss had addressed only whether the 
named individual defendants were plaintiffs’ “employers.”  Id.  In addition to other considerations, 
those actions did not amount to waiver.  Thus, regardless of context, waiver in the Fifth Circuit is a 
multifaceted issue not solely dependent on the passage of time or litigation conduct. 
 115.   The Fourth Circuit uses its own terminology to address waiver issues.  Relying on Section 
3 of the FAA, which provides for waiver if a party “is not in default in proceeding with such 
arbitration,” 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012), the Fourth Circuit has applied a “default” analysis where other courts 
have relied on waiver.  Though similar to waiver, default applies when “the circumstances giving rise 
to a statutory default are limited and, in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, are not to be 
lightly inferred.”  Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 702 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985)).  Although 
functionally the Fourth Circuit’s search for prejudice in analyzing “default” rather than “waiver” is 
the same as other circuits, its source of the authority in the FAA rather than principles of contract law 
is a notable difference compared to courts such as the Seventh Circuit. 
 116.   MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Lauricia, 268 F.3d 244, 251 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fraser v. Merrill 
Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
 117.   Id. at 250–51, 254 (reversing the district court’s finding of waiver based on “remarkably 
aggressive” litigation strategy where expenses incurred in litigation related primarily to state law 
claims rather than federal claims subject to arbitration).  Indeed, the facts of the MicroStrategy case 
reflect such prejudice relating to the plaintiff’s state law claims that Professor Lilly suggests “[t]he 
MicroStrategy case indicates that the Fourth Circuit may be the most difficult circuit in which to 
establish the required prejudice.”  Lilly, supra note 6, at 105.  At the same time, however, the Fourth 
Circuit aligns closely with the Fifth Circuit in holding that where a party must respond to discovery 
motions and other motions in litigation, waiver prevents subsequent compelled arbitration.  But see 
Fraser, 817 F.2d at 252 (non-discovery and discovery proceedings prejudiced plaintiff to the extent 
they related to arbitrable claims). 
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the right to arbitration is disfavored because it is a contractual right, and 
thus ‘any party arguing waiver of arbitration bears a heavy burden of 
proof.’”118 
Closer to the position of the Seventh Circuit, courts within the D.C. 
and Tenth Circuits119 rarely require evidence of prejudice when making 
waiver determinations.  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit rejects the Fifth 
Circuit’s search-for-unequivocal-prejudice approach and instead applies a 
six-factor totality of the circumstances test that further reflects the nuances 
of the law of waiver.120  One of the six non-dispositive factors is “whether 
the delay ‘affected, misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.”121  And as 
discussed further in Part IV, when a party within the Tenth Circuit fails to 
take advantage of a change in the law permitting arbitration and 
nevertheless pursues litigation through trial, it may waive the right to 
compel arbitration despite a change in the law that otherwise would have 
revived a right to arbitrate claims.122 
Timeliness in pursuing arbitration is also central to how the D.C. 
Circuit assesses waiver.  There, as in the Seventh Circuit, a defendant who 
does not assert the contractual right to arbitrate at the first opportunity, 
“typically in filing his first responsive pleading or motion to dismiss, has 
presumptively forfeited that right.”123 
The remainder of the federal courts occupy the muddled middle 
ground where prejudice plays a role in a totality of the circumstances test 
                                                          
 118.   Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 119.   The Tenth Circuit, in fact, adheres to the Seventh Circuit’s contractual nature analysis of 
waiver in noting that “the right to arbitration, like any other contract right, can be waived.”  Reid 
Burton Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 614 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam)).   
 120.   See, e.g., Reid Burton Constr., 614 F.2d at 702 (“There is no set rule as to what constitutes 
a waiver.”).  These have been referred to as “equitable principles.”  Id. at 701 n.6 (quoting Reid Burton 
Constr., Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of S. Colo., 535 F.2d 598, 604 (10th Cir. 1976).  See also 
Strong v. Davidson, 734 F. App’x 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2018) (referring to equitable principles). 
 121.   Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Peterson v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 849 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir. 1988)).  In this sense, 
the Tenth Circuit is similar to the position of the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International 
Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration, which states that “the Restatement regards prejudice and 
related fairness considerations as relevant and weighty but not indispensable to a finding that a party 
has waived an international arbitration agreement.”  RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION § 2-19 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., 
Tent. Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 122.   Id. at 1489–90 (explaining that defendant waited too long and failed to notify the district 
court of the change in the law clarifying the availability of arbitration). 
 123.   Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(c)).  See also Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 
777 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This circuit has never included prejudice as a separate and independent element 
of the showing necessary to demonstrate waiver of the right to arbitration.”). 
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to assess waiver.124  In the First Circuit, a “modicum of prejudice” will be 
sufficient to establish waiver.125  In others, the totality test controls, but 
standards are far from uniform in that different totality tests emphasize 
different components of waiver.126  The Third Circuit, in fact, applies a 
six-part test just to analyze prejudice.127  And in the Sixth Circuit, some 
panels have applied a prejudice standard,128 where others in older 
decisions have noted that waiver may occur without prejudice.129 
And when prejudice is required, courts offer no concrete guidance as 
to the necessary elements.  As Professor Lilly suggests, “Generally, the 
circuits that require unqualified prejudice avoid any precise statement as 
to what constitutes a sufficient showing, and instead list various 
circumstances that may be considered in assessing prejudice, such as 
delay, expense, attempts to relitigate issues lost in court, and the use of 
litigation discovery procedures.”130 
In other words, the doctrine of waiver is largely defined by an absence 
of uniformity.  Although the central question turns on whether a party’s 
                                                          
 124.   The extensive discussion of prejudice at the waiver stage is significant because prejudice 
reappears as a component of the revival standard, albeit more as a secondary inquiry.  Courts at both 
stages tend to view waiver and revival through an equitable lens, which can accommodate the peculiar 
facts and fairness considerations—i.e., the scope of prejudice—of any case. 
 125.   Rankin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 336 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX 
Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 221–22 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 126.   See, e.g., Gen. Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 438 
(6th Cir. 2002) (finding that “[a]n agreement to arbitrate may be waived by the actions of a party which 
are completely inconsistent with any reliance thereon” (quoting Germany v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 
477 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)); Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 
1315–16 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate . . . we 
decide if, ‘under the totality of the circumstances,’ the party ‘has acted inconsistently with the 
arbitration right,’ and . . . we look to see whether, by doing so, that party ‘has in some way prejudiced 
the other party.’” (quoting S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th 
Cir. 1990))); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Given this dominant 
federal policy favoring arbitration, waiver of the right to compel arbitration due to participation in 
litigation may be found only when prejudice to the other party is demonstrated.”); S. Sys., Inc. v. 
Torrid Oven Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (“In light of the Sixth Circuit’s 
emphasis on inconsistent conduct and no mention of prejudice, this court will treat prejudice as a 
significant factor but not a dispositive one.”). 
 127.   See, e.g., Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 926–27 (3d Cir. 1992)) (listing a six-part 
“nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the prejudice inquiry”). 
 128.   Johnson Assocs. Corp. v. HL Operating Corp., 680 F.3d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that waiver occurs when a party takes actions that are completely inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate 
and by “delaying its assertion to such an extent that the opposing party incurs actual prejudice” 
(quoting Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 610 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2010))). 
 129.   River Terminal Ry. Co., 477 F.2d at 547 (“An agreement to arbitrate may be waived by the 
actions of a party which are completely inconsistent with any reliance thereon.” (citing Burton-Dixie 
Corp. v. Timothy McCarthy Constr. Co., 436 F.2d 405, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1971))). 
 130.   Lilly, supra note 6, at 106–07 (footnotes omitted). 
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participation in litigation is inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, no two 
circuits agree precisely on how to answer that question or the extent to 
which prejudice should play a role.  Because revival necessarily depends 
on the scope of waiver in the first instance—or absence of waiver if that is 
the scenario—the revival doctrine similarly varies by jurisdiction. 
The picture of waiver is no clearer among state courts.  Because state 
courts dealing with the question of whether waiver exists under the FAA 
tend to look to their federal counterparts for guidance,131 it is not surprising 
that the familiar divergence of standards exists.  Texas courts, for instance, 
explicitly reject the Seventh Circuit’s stance that prejudice is not necessary 
and instead hold that, even construing waiver in the contractual setting, the 
party “must take action inconsistent with its right to arbitration, and the 
party claiming waiver must be prejudiced.”132  Like the Fourth Circuit, 
South Carolina courts require a demonstration of “actual prejudice” to 
support waiver.133  But in California, much like in the D.C. Circuit,134 
prejudice does not register as a central concern because “if a contract 
provision is subject to arbitration and a party seeks a judicial resolution of 
a disagreement which falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, 
that party waives its right to arbitration.”135 
Recently, an appellate court in the state of Washington provided one 
of the more detailed and thoughtful analyses of the law on waiver by 
surveying the federal- and state-court landscape before adopting the Third 
Circuit’s six-factor standard to assess the extent of prejudice.136  However, 
the decision in Schuster v. Prestige Senior Management, L.L.C., while 
exhaustive in its analysis, paints a picture of national waiver standards that 
                                                          
 131.   Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707, 710 (Fla. 2005) (“We agree 
that decisions of the federal circuit courts are persuasive precedent on this issue, but they are not 
binding.”). 
 132.   Hous. Lighting & Power Co. v. City of San Antonio, 896 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. App. 1995) 
(citing Psarianos v. Standard Marine, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 438, 449 (E.D. Tex. 1989)).  Illinois state 
courts have also rejected the Cabinetree holding, noting that the Seventh Circuit authority is not 
binding.  See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., 896 So.2d at 711 (noting that prejudice is not required 
for waiver, and arbitration can be waived when a party “actually participat[es] in a lawsuit or tak[es] 
action inconsistent with that right”); LAS, Inc. v. Mini-Tankers, USA, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 633, 638 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) (finding no waiver because “the defendant did not substantially participate in the trial 
court litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and the plaintiff neither claimed nor 
demonstrated any prejudice from the defendant’s filing of its section 2–619 motion to dismiss [735 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2–619] prior to its assertion of its right to arbitrate”). 
 133.   Rich v. Walsh, 590 S.E.2d 506, 509–10 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 134.   Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
 135.   Aviation Data, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 410 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (citing St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. Of Evansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 
969 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 136.   Schuster v. Prestige Senior Mgmt., L.L.C., 376 P.3d 412, 423–27 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
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appear to be little more than a confusing array of terms.  Ultimately, the 
Schuster court concluded that participation in litigation for a year-and-a-
half was sufficient prejudice to establish waiver when the entity seeking 
arbitration could have immediately exercised that right upon 
commencement of the case.137 
In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Saldukas,138 the Florida 
Supreme Court tried to cut through the maze of confusion and took a step 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has thus far been unable to accomplish—
resolving a circuit court split on waiver standards.139  Surveying the 
Florida lower-court landscape, the Florida high court noticed two defined 
bodies of case law—one that required prejudice to find waiver and one 
that did not.140  Prior to Saldukas, the Florida Supreme Court had merely 
held that “a party’s contract rights may be waived by actually participating 
in a lawsuit or taking action inconsistent with that right” without 
referencing prejudice.141  Adopting the D.C. Circuit’s standard and logic 
that the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements is based 
upon contract principles rather than a preference for arbitration, the 
Saldukas court agreed that the crucial question is “whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the defaulting party has acted inconsistently 
with the arbitration right.”142  Thus “there is no requirement for proof of 
prejudice in order for there to be an effective waiver of the right to 
arbitrate” in Florida.143 
 
                                                          
 137.   Id. at 427. 
 138.   896 So.2d 707 (Fla. 2005). 
 139.   Id. at 710 (noting the United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether proof of 
prejudice is required for waiver under the FAA).  In 2010, the Supreme Court granted a petition for a 
writ of certiorari to resolve the issue of whether prejudice was a necessary element of a waiver by 
litigation.  See Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
562 U.S. 1215 (2011).  The question was presented as: “Under the Federal Arbitration Act . . . should 
a party be required to demonstrate prejudice after the opposing party waived its contractual right to 
arbitrate by participating in litigation, in order for such waiver to be binding and irrevocable?”  Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Citibank, 562 U.S. 1215 (2011) (No. 10–514).  But the writ was dismissed 
when the case settled prior to review by the Supreme Court.  131 S. Ct. 2955 (2011). 
 140.   896 So.2d at 710 (noting that Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal does not require a 
showing of prejudice to find waiver, whereas the Third District requires a showing of prejudice).  Prior 
to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, three intermediate appeals courts did not require a prejudice 
showing to establish waiver while two other intermediate appeals courts required proof of prejudice.  
Id. 
 141.   896 So.2d at 711 (citing Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So.2d 678, 680 
(Fla. 1973)). 
 142.   Id. (quoting Nat’l Found. for Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 
774 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 143.   Id. (concluding that “the conflict among the district courts should be resolved in accord with 
the Second District’s decision” that prejudice is not a requirement to finding waiver). 
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C. The Aggregate Action Context – An Uncomfortable Meeting of 
Waiver Principles and Rule 23 
The scope of waiver is also heavily influenced by the nature of the 
underlying action, particularly if a plaintiff seeks to represent a class under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, an equivalent state-law analog, or 
bring a collective action under Section 16(b) of the FLSA.  Waiver is 
perhaps trickiest to analyze in the class-action setting because courts must 
consider not only waiver doctrine but also their own jurisdictional 
boundaries with regard to proposed class members.  After all, in the class-
action setting, courts analyze not only whether a defendant waived the 
right to arbitrate as to the plaintiff but also as to the unnamed, absent class 
members.  Answers to those questions may also turn on the procedural 
nuance of whether the case has been “certified” or approved for class 
treatment by the court at the time the defendant seeks to compel 
arbitration. 
Class certification is an important milestone in any class-action case 
because it marks the point at which the trial court has jurisdiction over the 
claims of the class members.  At the outset, of course, the claims of the 
named plaintiffs are before the court, but until the court issues an order 
certifying the class pursuant to Rule 23 standards, the class does not exist 
and claims of absent class members are outside a trial court’s legal 
purview. 
This understanding of the class-action landscape is premised upon a 
number of United States Supreme Court and other federal court opinions.  
In Smith v. Bayer Corp.,144 the Court addressed who was a “party” to a 
case and who was bound by a court’s decision: 
[W]e have further held that an unnamed member of a certified class may 
be “considered a ‘party’ for the [particular] purpos[e] of appealing” an 
adverse judgment.  But as the dissent in Devlin noted, no one in that case 
was “willing to advance the novel and surely erroneous argument that a 
nonnamed class member is a party to the class-action litigation before 
the class is certified.”145 
Consequently, construing whether arbitration rights have been waived 
                                                          
 144.   564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 145.   Id. at 313 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 
U.S. 1, 7 (2002); then quoting id. at 16 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 593 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally 
bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.” (citing Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. at 
313)). 
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as to putative, unnamed class members requires courts in the first instance 
to explore whether those putative class members are even before the 
court.146  For ease of reference, the discussion of the approaches below is 
divided between courts that found waiver in a class setting and those that 
did not. 
1. When Waiver Exists in a Class or Collective Action Setting 
Despite the seeming clarity, some courts find waiver to exist, even as 
to proposed class members’ claims, depending on the waiver analysis vis-
à-vis the named plaintiffs.  A New Mexico appellate court recently 
affirmed waiver regarding proposed class members’ claims based on the 
defendant’s pre-certification actions despite the district court’s lack of 
jurisdiction to compel unnamed class members to arbitrate their claims 
prior to certification.147  In affirming, the appeals court explained how 
framing the relevant question made all the difference: 
But the question is not whether or when absent class members would be 
bound by an order compelling arbitration; the question is whether 
Defendants waived their right to invoke their right to arbitrate disputes 
with absent class members.  Simply because the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to compel absent class members to arbitrate their 
claims does not mean that Defendants had no obligation to rely upon the 
clause before the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify.148 
In other words, even though moving to compel arbitration of absent 
class-member claims would have been impossible (because the court 
                                                          
 146.   The Third Circuit has held that prior to certification, the unnamed putative class members 
were not before the court until the class was certified.  Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Tr., 155 
F.3d 644, 659 (3d Cir. 1998), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 
F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Barnes v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 2d 798, 801 (N.D. 
Ohio 2007) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held unnamed class members in class action 
suits are considered parties only in limited circumstances (i.e. for notice of dismissal and settlement 
by named plaintiffs and standing to appeal settlements by named class representatives, upon timely 
notice of objection).”).  Some authorities, however, contend that putting labels on absent class 
members is not productive.  See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:5 (5th 
ed. 2011) (“The position that absent class members occupy in class action litigation is sui generis, and 
attempts to analogize to conventional ‘party’ status are likely to fail.  It is more logical for a court 
faced with a question concerning the rights and duties of absent class members to analyze the issue 
presented with reference to the goals of representative litigation . . . .”).  But this approach does not 
create any meaningful tests for the waiver analysis and is disconnected from both Rule 23 and the 
courts’ jurisdiction. 
 147.   Tennyson v. Santa Fe Dealership Acquisition II, Inc., 364 P.3d 1273, 1279–80 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
 148.   Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Cox Enters., Inc. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust 
Litig., 790 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015)). 
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could not have ruled within its jurisdiction), the court nevertheless held 
that the defendant waived the right to compel arbitration against absent 
class members by engaging in “nearly three years of extensive litigation, 
discovery,” and class certification briefing.149  So the theory of extra-
jurisdictional waiver depends on the court separating its jurisdictional 
limitations from its authority over the defendant during the litigation. 
Relying on that technique may be compelling for courts primarily 
concerned about fairness and efficiency in litigation.150  A Southern 
District of Florida court followed that path in 2016, pointing to concerns 
the years of litigation were poised to be rendered moot by a motion to 
compel arbitration of the claims of the absent class members.151  In 
denying the motion to compel arbitration for unnamed class members, the 
trial court noted that the defendant financial institution “chose litigation, 
rather than arbitration” from the outset, prompting the court and the parties 
to devote “enormous amounts of time and resources.”152  Considering the 
costs expended in the case, the Gutierrez trial court said that “[i]f the Court 
now ordered arbitration for the class, all of the time and effort of the 
parties, counsel, this Court, and the Eleventh Circuit that has been devoted 
to this case will have been almost entirely wasted.  The result would be 
gross inefficiency.”153  Rule 23 principles, the court held, were decisional 
guideposts that required rejection of the defendant’s argument to “analyze 
the waiver issue in a vacuum.”154  That approach, the court held, “without 
                                                          
 149.   Id. at 1280. 
 150.   For instance, a California appellate court easily affirmed a finding of waiver in a class action 
by noting that the defendant “delayed for an astonishing 17 months after [the plaintiff] filed his 
complaint before it sought to enforce the arbitration agreement.”  Oregel v. PacPizza, LLC, 187 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 436, 449, 451 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015); see also In re Cox Enters., 790 F.3d at 1119 (affirming 
waiver because “Cox could have asserted its right to arbitrate against Healy at any time during the 
course of the litigation, and that it could have asserted its right to arbitrate against the absent class 
members as a possible defense against class certification”).  Likewise, another California appellate 
court recently held that regardless of the absence of jurisdiction over absent class members, a “trial 
court could properly consider [a defendant’s] delay in seeking arbitration against [the named plaintiff] 
when deciding whether it had waived its right to compel arbitration against unnamed class members 
following certification.”  Sprunk v. Prisma LLC, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); see 
also Watts v. U.S. TelePacific Corp., No. B277100, 2018 WL 2112134, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 
2018) (finding waiver where the named plaintiffs had valid arbitration agreements because “from the 
onset of this litigation, TelePacific could have moved to compel arbitration.  It chose not to do so, and 
it is now bound by that decision. . . . Under these circumstances, TelePacific had no reason to wait 
until after class certification to bring its motion to compel arbitration.”). 
 151.   In re: Checking Account Overdraft Litig., No. 1:09-MD-02036-JLK, 2016 WL 6082035 
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016), vacated sub nom. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 889 F.3d 1230 (11th 
Cir. 2018) 
 152.   Id. at *6. 
 153.   Id. 
 154.   Id. 
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considering the Bank’s pre-certification attempts to win this case on the 
merits . . . is antithetical to both the basic purpose, and to the practical 
realities, of class actions under Rule 23.”155 
In May 2018, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the 
trial court order, holding that Wells Fargo “did not act inconsistently with 
its arbitration rights as to the unnamed Plaintiffs” because “it would have 
been impossible in practice to compel arbitration against speculative 
plaintiffs and jurisdictionally impossible for the District Court to rule on 
those motions before the class was certified.”156  That is, prior to class 
certification, the Eleventh Circuit explained “any plaintiffs beyond those 
named in the complaint are speculative and beyond the reach of the 
Court’s power” with respect to enforcement or non-enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.157  The Eleventh Circuit went on to clarify that 
advance protection against waiver is not necessary in the putative class-
action setting; “we have found no authority that requires a party to file a 
conditional arbitration motion against possible future adversaries—at a 
juncture in which adjudicating, much less exercising jurisdiction over, 
those claims is impossible—in order to avoid waiving its rights with regard 
to those parties.”158 
In the wage-and-hour setting, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied a conduct-related approach to deny a motion to compel arbitration 
of hundreds of “opt-in” claims in Gunn v. NPC International, Inc. in 
2015.159  Gunn involved an FLSA Section 16(b) collective action, which 
provides for class-like treatment similar to Rule 23 but requires individual 
plaintiffs to affirmatively opt into the case rather than certifying a class 
and fine-tuning it on Rule 23’s opt-out procedure.160  Consequently, FLSA 
collective action members may “opt-in” at various points in time 
throughout the duration of a given case.  Gunn was initially filed in 
                                                          
 155.   Id. 
 156.   Gutierrez, 889 F.3d at 1237–38. 
 157.   Id. at 1238. 
 158.   Id. at 1239.  The Eleventh Circuit also emphasized that “the key ingredient in the waiver 
analysis is fair notice to the opposing party and the District Court of a party’s arbitration rights and its 
intent to exercise them.  If the court and the opposing party have such notice at an early stage in 
litigation, they can manage the litigation with this contingency in mind.”  Id. at 1236.  Early in the 
case—before any discovery had been conducted—Wells Fargo explained “that it was not in a position 
to assert its arbitration rights against the unnamed Plaintiffs but wished to preserve those rights for 
when the matter became ripe for the Court to consider them.”  Id. at 1237. 
 159.   625 F. App’x 261 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 160.   29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231) (“No employee shall be 
a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and 
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”); see also supra notes 75–78 and 
accompanying text.  
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January 2013, and by April 2014, more than 200 opt-in plaintiffs had filed 
consents to join the case, at which point the defendant employer attempted 
to assert the arbitration clause in the employment contracts.161  Rather than 
assess waiver on when each individual opt-in joined the case, the Sixth 
Circuit treated all of the claims the same.  That is, because the claims of 
each opt-in plaintiff involved the same court, counsel, and underlying 
policies, “the effects of NPC’s failure to timely raise arbitration—in 
unnecessary delay and expense—is effectively the same for all plaintiffs, 
irrespective of when they opted in.”162  After all, the court went on, the 
advantages of collective treatment under the FLSA would “be 
unnecessarily and imprudently subverted if the waiver issue had to be 
individually assessed in relation to each plaintiff.”163  Arbitration rights 
were subordinate to the efficiency of aggregate litigation. 
Some courts in the class- or collective-action setting tend to be 
reluctant to permit a defendant to raise arbitration late in the procedural 
history of the case when there is a sense that a defendant is trying to take 
advantage of or abuse the legal process.  That is, “[a]n attempt to gain a 
strategic advantage through litigation in court before seeking to compel 
arbitration is a paradigm of conduct that is inconsistent with the right to 
arbitrate.”164  A central district of California court, for instance, found 
waiver in 2012 when, after several years of litigating, a defendant title 
insurance company moved to compel arbitration of class members’ claims 
following class certification.165  In Edwards v. First American Corp., the 
court acknowledged that moving to compel arbitration of the class claims 
would have been futile prior to class certification but castigated the 
defendants for never mentioning their intention to raise arbitration as a 
defense until after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the class certification 
order.166  And even then, the defendants waited an additional ten months 
to move to compel arbitration, prompting backlash from the court for 
conduct that  
appear[ed] to be highly calculated—Defendants would obviously prefer 
that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed on the merits, as any such ruling may 
be used for the purposes of issue preclusion and precedential effect in 
subsequent actions. . . . Only after it appeared to Defendants that this 
                                                          
 161.   625 F. App’x at 267. 
 162.   Id. 
 163.   Id. at 267–68. 
 164.   Sprunk v. Prisma LLC, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 165.   Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 289 F.R.D. 296, 306 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 166.   Id. at 307–08.  See Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 385 F. App’x 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.) 
(reversing district court’s denial of class certification). 
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would not be possible did they file the instant motion.167 
Describing such tactics as improper “gamesmanship,” the court 
concluded the defendants waived their right to arbitrate the class claims.168 
When consolidation of multiple class actions leads to multidistrict 
litigation, the resulting class membership may implicate waiver if some 
class members have arbitration agreements and others do not.  The First 
Circuit encountered that issue in In re Citigroup, Inc. in 2004, where it 
held that the defendant waived its right to arbitrate the claims of class 
members with arbitration agreements because of its litigation conduct.169  
The defendant waited too long—more than three years after the filing of 
the complaint and eighteen months after class certification—before 
moving to compel arbitration.170  Such an extended interval was “sufficient 
to waive Travelers’s right to arbitrate, as long as the delay was prejudicial 
to plaintiffs.”171 
Finally, in the class setting, the scope or existence of waiver can be 
unclear if a defendant company’s officer testifies that the company does 
not intend to enforce arbitration provisions for a given class of litigants—
even if that testimony occurs outside of the underlying case.  In Mitchell 
v. Wells Fargo Bank,172 a federal court in Utah recently reserved judgment 
on whether Wells Fargo’s chief executive officer effectively waived the 
bank’s right to assert arbitration clauses in defense of a financial fraud 
class action regarding unauthorized customer accounts. 
During the pendency of the case, Wells Fargo CEO Timothy Sloan 
testified before Congress and stated that “Wells Fargo is no longer 
utilizing forced arbitration in cases of unauthorized accounts.”173  In 
deciding whether Wells Fargo waived the right to compel arbitration of 
sixty-five of the sixty-seven class members’ claims, the court found the 
following testimony particularly relevant: 
Senator Tester: Okay, Tim, the only time I get in fights with folks who 
                                                          
 167.   289 F.R.D. at 307. 
 168.   Id. at 307–08.  On the other hand, when a defendant timely moves to compel arbitration of 
class member claims following class certification, a court may be more inclined to conclude no waiver 
exists.  In Allied Sanitation, Inc. v. Waste Management Holdings, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 320, 332 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court concluded that a motion to compel class member arbitration would have 
been futile before class certification and a two-month delay following certification “was totally benign 
and cannot realistically form part of the prejudice mix.” 
 169.   376 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 170.   Id. at 27. 
 171.   Id. (citing Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 221–22 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(finding prejudice when defendant delayed for a year)). 
 172.   280 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (D. Utah 2017). 
 173.   Id. at 1296. 
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are talking is when they don’t give me a yes or no answer when I really 
ask it, and the question is this, and you can ask it another way, answer it 
in another way if you want, but, uh, are you, will you commit to not use 
forced arbitration on accounts that were not authorized by the customer? 
Timothy Sloan: The, the easy answer for that, uh, Senator, is yes, because 
we haven’t done that. 
Senator Tester: Okay. 
Timothy Sloan: We’re, we are not doing that. 
Senator Tester: And you’re not going to do it moving forward? 
Timothy Sloan: We’re not doing that.174 
That testimony, the court held, created an issue of fact as to whether 
Wells Fargo waived its arbitral rights because, as the CEO, Sloan’s 
statements could bind the corporation.175  Ultimately, the courts that find 
waiver in the class setting tend to do so when the circumstances of the 
litigation suggest that waiver would be or could be an equitable solution 
to a complex dilemma. 
2. When Waiver Does Not Exist in a Class or Collective Action Setting 
Not surprisingly, when courts hold that defendants did not waive the 
right to compel arbitration as to absent class members, those opinions 
emphasize jurisdictional concepts that would have rendered earlier 
motions pointless.176 
A Northern District of California court expounded at length on these 
issues in 2011 when it held in an antitrust class action that defendants had 
not waived their right to arbitrate against “unnamed members” of the 
class.177  In In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, the 
                                                          
 174.   Id.  See also Wells Fargo: One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 12 (2017) (discussion between Timothy Sloan, CEO & President of 
Wells Fargo, and Sen. Tester).  
 175.   Id. at 1296–97. 
 176.   See, e.g., Mora v. Harley-Davidson Credit Corp., No. 1:08-cv-01453-AWI-BAM, 2012 WL 
1189769, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2012) (holding no right to compel arbitration against unnamed, 
proposed class members prior to class certification).  Similarly, when a plaintiff without an arbitration 
agreement files a class action, a defendant may not compel arbitration simply because unnamed, 
proposed class members have arbitration agreements.  See Lee v. S. Cal. Univ. for Prof’l Studies, 56 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 134, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“We affirm and find that no grounds exist for compelling 
arbitration when the only plaintiff currently before the court never agreed to arbitrate her claims.”). 
 177.   In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. M 07–1827 SI, 2011 WL 1753784 (N.D. 
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defendants had filed two motions to dismiss, opposed class certification, 
and participated in discovery—all without seeking arbitration against the 
named plaintiffs.178  But when the defendants moved to compel arbitration, 
they specifically excluded named plaintiffs from the scope of the motion; 
rather, the defendants directed the motion towards the class members who 
entered into arbitration agreements with one or more of the defendants but 
who did not exclude themselves from the class during the opt-out period 
following class certification.179  That made all the difference to the court 
in granting the motion to compel because the “defendants could [not] have 
moved to compel arbitration against such entities prior to the certification 
of a class . . . because . . . ‘putative class members are not parties to an 
action prior to class certification.’”180  Defendants had therefore not 
waived their right to arbitrate against “unnamed members” of the class.181 
The jurisdictional hurdle, in fact, presents itself when defendants 
move to compel arbitration before a class certification ruling.  As courts 
encountering such strategies have held, there is “no procedure or authority 
under [the FAA] to compel putative class members, who are not currently 
before the court and, because a class has not yet been certified, have not 
even received notice of the litigation, to arbitrate their potential claims 
against Defendants.”182 
The same analysis applies—in some courts—in the FLSA wage-and-
hour context when opt-in plaintiffs have not joined the case.  Recently, in 
Taylor v. Pilot Corp., the Middle District of Tennessee took a different 
approach from the Sixth Circuit in Gunn and held at the Conditional 
Certification stage—before any opt-in plaintiffs had filed consent forms—
“[d]efendants would have been unable to compel putative class members’ 
claims to arbitration.”183  Therefore, with respect to those putative class 
members, the defendants did not waive the right to arbitrate their claims.  
                                                          
Cal. May 9, 2011). 
 178.   Id. at *3. 
 179.   Id. at *4. 
 180.   Id. at *4 (quoting Saleh v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 181.   Id.; see also Sky Sports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 405, 409–10 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding no waiver prior to class certification under California law because “had the company 
brought a motion to compel arbitration before class certification, the trial court would have denied the 
motion because [the named plaintiff] was not a party to the arbitration agreement”). 
 182.   Whittington v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., No. 10-cv-01884-KMT-MEH, 2011 WL 1772401, 
*5 (D. Colo. May 10, 2011); see also Hafer v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 987, 
1010 n.12 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“The Court does not hereby rule on the arbitrability of the claims of 
putative class members.  Given that no class has been certified, such a ruling would be premature.” 
(citing Whittington, 2011 WL 1772401, at *5)). 
 183.   Taylor v. Pilot Corp., No. 14-cv-2294-SHL-tmp, 2016 WL 4524310, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 
3, 2016), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 854 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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In Taylor though, the defendants had raised arbitration as a defense several 
times, supporting the court’s conclusion of an absence of waiver.184  Thus, 
jurisdictional concerns combined with diligence on the defendant’s part in 
alerting the court to the arbitration issues appeared to influence the result. 
D. The Impact of the Lack of a Uniform Standard 
The patchwork of standards throughout the country leaves a waiver 
doctrine that largely lacks definition or explicit boundaries.  The scope of 
whether arbitrable rights have been waived depends not just on the 
circumstances of a given case, but also the address of the courthouse.  The 
inconsistency with regard to adjudication not only undermines the 
perceived validity of judicial decisions, but it injects inefficiency into the 
legal system because litigants must play a guessing game at which 
standards and rules ultimately will govern their dispute.  And the same 
waiver standards should generally be applicable to both defendants and 
plaintiffs.185 
Some uniform waiver guidelines would inject more certainty into the 
dispute resolution arena.  For instance, it makes little sense that different 
federal court jurisdictions would apply different waiver tests or that class 
certification would matter in one circuit but not another.  Either a showing 
of prejudice to the party opposing arbitration should be required or it 
should not.  Of course, the individual circumstances of any given case 
underlying a waiver argument will differ and should be considered.  But 
those facts should be analyzed against the same legal backdrop that uses 
the same test for waiver whether the court sits in Chicago, Dallas, or Fargo. 
That is not to say that a fixed bright-line rule is the preferred solution.  
At the very least, the Tenth Circuit offers wise advice, for instance, against 
                                                          
 184.   Id.  Indeed, when Pilot sought interlocutory review of the order conditionally certifying an 
FLSA notice class, the Sixth Circuit agreed that Pilot had not—and could not have—compelled any 
non-parties to arbitrate their claims.  Taylor v. Pilot Corp., 697 F. App’x 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(“When Pilot requested a stay, no plaintiff in the litigation had a claim—or an issue in a claim—
referable to arbitration.”).  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Pilot 
was not entitled to a stay of the proceedings pending arbitration because, up to that point, no opt-in 
plaintiffs with arbitration agreements had joined the case.  Id.  See also In re Checking Account 
Overdraft Litig., 780 F.3d 1031, 1037 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Absent class certification, there is no 
justiciable controversy between Wells Fargo and the unnamed putative class members.  Furthermore, 
because the unnamed putative class members are not yet before the court, any claims that they might 
have against Wells Fargo necessarily exist only by hypothesis.”). 
 185.   See Tulip v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, No. 69306–9–I, 2014 WL 1977235 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 
2014) (holding plaintiff suing in state court under state law claim waived his right to arbitrate by 
participating as an opt-in plaintiff in class and collective actions in federal court asserting similar 
federal law claims and only asserted his right to arbitrate after dismissal of the class and collective 
claims). 
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“adopt[ing] a bright-line rule of waiver just because a party has filed a 
lawsuit.”186  Such a rule would result in waiver even if a party filed a 
complaint one day and voluntarily dismissed it the next before even 
executing service.187  Obviously such a result would be preposterous and 
would never be followed.  As Judge Paul V. Gadola urged in dissent in 
1991, “[i]f the mere filing of a complaint followed by immediate dismissal 
does not constitute submission of issues, some line drawing must be 
done.”188  If so, he argued, “submission of issues” in the form of “[a] trial 
or dispositive motion” should be the metric by which to measure waiver.189 
These sorts of common-sense approaches to waiver, interestingly, 
invoke the analysis of the early equity-oriented cases.  After all, it seems 
appropriate as an equitable matter that a party engaging in dispositive 
motion practice, without previously raising an arbitration defense, may be 
deemed to have waived the right to assert arbitration.  And, in the class-
action context, a court’s jurisdictional authority to issue decisions 
regarding the enforcement of absent class members’ arbitration 
agreements is a significant issue causing disagreements among the courts.  
That is particularly true when the perception of “gamesmanship” appears 
to drive courts’ decision-making.190  But what constitutes gamesmanship 
to one judge may just be routine litigation tactics to another.  Therefore, 
reliance on equitable considerations should come into play, if at all, only 
as a last resort to prevent waiver doctrine from continuing to turn on the 
fairness assessments of individual judges. 
And while each case must be decided based on its peculiar facts, a 
uniform starting point for analysis would be useful.  We do know that 
waiver can be implied from conduct and that proof of subjective intent is 
not required—but sometimes little else.  The variety of standards that 
currently apply to waiver are further reflected in how courts assess 
revival—both in determining whether revival is even necessary, and, if so, 
whether it is appropriate given the factual circumstances of a particular 
case. 
While a determination of the ultimate decision-making mechanism is 
difficult, it seems that some standard that has a factual basis beyond the 
mere filing of an answer is appropriate.  The question is easier in the class-
action context where principles of due process and compliance with Rule 
23 offer guidance.  That is, when a court lacks jurisdiction over a putative 
                                                          
 186.   BOSC, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 853 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 187.   WorldSource Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Constr. Co., 946 F.2d 473, 483 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(Gadola, J., dissenting) (posing the same hypothetical). 
 188.   Id. 
 189.   Id. 
 190.   See, e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 289 F.R.D. 296, 307–08 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
2018 SEARCHING FOR CLARITY AMID CONFUSION 363 
class (i.e. before class certification), then a court should not wade into the 
murky waters of waiver with respect to those unknown class members.  No 
defendant, after all, has a right to compel arbitration of claims not before 
the court.  So there is no reason to make a waiver determination prior to 
class certification when neither all of the parties nor their potential claims 
are before the court.  That enhanced clarity could save significant judicial 
resources while preserving arbitral rights before they exist in the class-
action setting. 
IV. REVIVAL OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE – WHEN, HOW AND WHY? 
Once waiver exists, regardless of the standard applied, three concerns 
influence courts’ decisions regarding revival of the right to arbitrate.  First, 
the general federal policy favoring arbitration also applies where the court 
is considering reviving a party’s arbitration rights.191 
Indeed, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,192 an amended 
complaint supplants the plaintiff’s original one, and if it “changes the 
theory or scope of the case,”193 the defendant may plead anew as if it were 
responding to the original complaint.194  Courts extend this principle to 
cases where a party initially waived its right to arbitration but later seeks 
to assert it because an amended complaint reflects extensive changes. 
Second, revival of a party’s arbitration rights often turns on fairness 
concerns.  So, where an amended complaint significantly alters the course 
of litigation, fairness requires that the party seeking arbitration receive a 
chance to reassert its right to compel arbitration. 
In assessing fairness, courts consider the party’s diligence in seeking 
arbitration.195  A party’s deliberate delay in seeking arbitration will weigh 
against reviving a party’s arbitration rights.  This is especially true in cases 
where the party’s delay is based on tactical considerations—for example, 
when a party switches from a judicial forum to an arbitral tribunal to drain 
the opposing party’s budget. 
Finally, a court is less likely to revive a party’s right to arbitrate if the 
opposing party will be prejudiced.  That is true even in jurisdictions where 
                                                          
 191.   Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 192.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 
 193.   Brown v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 610 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
 194.   Krinsk, 654 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Brown, 610 F. Supp. at 78); see also Brown, 610 F. Supp. 
at 78 (noting that if a plaintiff “chooses to redo his original work, . . . he can hardly be heard to 
complain that claims filed against him are improper because they should have been asserted in 
response to his original pleading” (quoting Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, 
Inc., 50 F.R.D. 415, 419 (D. Del. 1970))). 
 195.   Cabinetree of Wis., Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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prejudice is not a requirement of waiver.196  Indeed, the Seventh Circuit 
has provided that in revival cases, prejudice to the party resisting 
arbitration “should weigh heavily in the decision [of] whether to send the 
case to arbitration.”197 
A. Revival Via Amended Pleading 
To support revival by an amended pleading, generally, the amended 
complaint or counterclaim must reflect changes that are both significant 
and unanticipated.198 
These components reflect global fairness considerations.  Courts are 
concerned that the party supporting revival would have pursued a different 
tactic if originally presented with the amended complaint.  But courts do 
not want to encourage parties to continuously switch forums, depleting 
both public and private resources. 
Typically, two types of changes in an amended complaint create 
significant, unanticipated alterations that warrant revival of the right to 
compel arbitration.  They concern: (1) changing the prospective class size, 
and (2) supplying new factual allegations or adding new claims that 
increase the defendant’s potential liability. 
1. If an Amended Class or Collective Action Complaint Significantly 
Increases the Plaintiff’s Class Size, a Party’s Right to Compel 
Arbitration May be Revived. 
The stakes involved with class or collective action litigation pursuant 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or state law create the potential 
for a revival situation.  That is, if at first the case presented by plaintiffs 
does not prompt a defendant to move to compel arbitration, that strategic 
                                                          
 196.   Id.  
 197.   Id. 
 198.   See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting the 
addition of arbitrable claims to a potentially non-arbitrable claim revives the right to arbitrate to all 
arbitrable claims despite the passage of time and discovery); Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Enright, 
940 F. Supp. 200, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Even if DBP’s act of filing suit somehow created a 
presumption of waiver . . . the counterclaim can be seen as an ‘unexpected development’ which 
justifies granting relief from the initial waiver. . . . JEI’s counterclaim significantly altered the nature 
of this litigation and operated to rejuvenate the right to demand arbitration.” (citing Cabinetree, 50 
F.3d at 391, and Envirex, Inc. v. K.H. Schussler Fur Umwelttechnik GMBH, 832 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 
(E.D. Wis. 1993))); Envirex, 832 F. Supp. at 1296 (“[T]he plaintiff has filed an amended complaint 
alleging a new basis for its fraud count, and then a second amended complaint alleging a new breach 
of warranty count.  The defendants promptly responded to the second amended complaint with this 
motion [to stay in favor of arbitration]. . . . [T]he new allegations in the amended complaints 
rejuvenate their right to demand arbitration.”). 
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calculus may change if and when class counsel amends a complaint to 
significantly expand the class.  The expansion may be so significant that 
the original waiver becomes ineffective, causing the defendant’s right to 
compel arbitration to be revived.  In the 2011 Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, 
Inc.199 opinion, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
as a matter of first impression, that a defendant may rescind its waiver of 
its arbitration right upon the filing of an amended complaint that 
dramatically enlarges the putative class.200 
In January 2010, six months after SunTrust filed a motion to dismiss, 
a district court granted leave for the plaintiff to amend her complaint.201  
The amended complaint asserted similar claims but, most notably, 
proposed a new class that “greatly enlarged the potential size of the 
putative class,”202 expanding it from hundreds to “thousands—if not the 
tens of thousands” of plaintiffs.203 
The Eleventh Circuit found that this case presented one of those 
limited circumstances where “fairness dictates that a waiver of arbitration 
be nullified by the filing of an amended complaint.”204  The new class 
definition “so altered the shape of litigation” that SunTrust was entitled to 
rescind its waiver despite its “prior invocations of the judicial process.”205  
Under no circumstances could SunTrust have foreseen, or prepared for, 
Krinsk’s amended complaint, which greatly expanded the putative class 
size to thousands, if not tens of thousands, of plaintiffs.206  So, “in plain 
fairness,” SunTrust’s prompt motion to compel arbitration should have 
rescinded its earlier waiver.207  The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the 
class size was relevant to SunTrust’s original litigation strategy.  For 
instance, if SunTrust had known that it faced a class size of thousands of 
plaintiffs, it might have elected to arbitrate from the beginning208—
especially given that its arbitration provision precluded resolution of class-
action disputes.209 
                                                          
 199.   654 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 200.   Id. at 1204. 
 201.   Id. at 1198–99.  
 202.   Id. at 1199. 
 203.   Id. at 1198–99.  
 204.   Id. at 1202. 
 205.   Id. at 1204. 
 206.   Id. 
 207.   Id. 
 208.   Id. (“SunTrust proceeded in court on the expectation that, if the class action were certified, 
it would defend itself against only the relatively small plaintiff class defined in the Original 
Complaint.”). 
 209.   Id. at 1197 n.1. 
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2. An Amended Complaint that Adds New Factual Allegations or 
Claims May Revive a Party’s Right to Compel Arbitration. 
Similar to a change in class size, an amended complaint that alters or 
enhances factual allegations may implicate revival.  In Brown v. E.F. 
Hutton & Co.,210 a Southern District of Florida court discussed a 
defendant’s right to a “fresh start” in answering a plaintiff’s amended 
complaint. 
Brown filed his initial complaint in 1980, on the basis of one 
transaction with E.F. Hutton, alleging a federal securities law violation, 
three counts of fraudulent misrepresentation, and a breach of fiduciary 
duty.211  Three years later, Brown agreed to a settlement but subsequently 
sought to set aside the agreement and amend his complaint, which the 
court allowed.212 
In his amended complaint, Brown “broadened the focus of the 
litigation” by pleading new factual allegations.213  Specifically, Brown 
alleged violations on the basis of “the entire course of dealings between 
the parties” and not on the one transaction previously asserted.214  In 
addition, Brown alleged that E.F. Hutton caused $150,000 in damages, a 
three-fold increase from the original complaint.215 
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Krinsk, the court noted that, under the 
Federal Rules, when an amended complaint “changes the theory or scope 
of the case,” the defendant is allowed to “plead anew as though it were the 
original complaint.”216 
A change in potential liability can also present a strong case for 
reviving the right to arbitrate, especially where it is drastic and 
unforeseeable.  Krinsk bolsters this position.  In that case, although the 
change in class size motivated the Krinsk holding, the underlying issue 
was the defendant’s increased potential liability.  Litigating against 
hundreds of plaintiffs was financially less risky than litigating against 
thousands, or tens of thousands of plaintiffs. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ Shareholders Corp. v. Southern Farm Bureau 
Life Insurance Co.217 illustrates how the addition of a new claim can affect 
                                                          
 210.   610 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
 211.   Id. at 77–78, 77 n.1. 
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the scope of potential liability—or not—for the first time.  The Eleventh 
Circuit took issue with the new claim in the amended complaint—the 
breach-of-contract allegation—in part because it gave the plaintiff access 
to new types of damages.218  By comparison, the other new claim in that 
case—the fraud-based fiduciary claim—did not differ in terms of damages 
from the previously asserted fraud claim.219  Thus, it appears that the court 
revived the right to arbitrate the former but not the latter claim. 
On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Gilmore v. 
Shearson/American Express Inc.220 paid little attention to the potential 
escalation in damages reflected by an amended complaint.  In that long-
running securities fraud case, the plaintiff Gilmore enlarged his claim of 
actual damages from $143,000 to $159,000 and punitive damages from 
$3,000,000 to $10,000,000.221  Shearson had then attempted to revive its 
right to pursue arbitration, but the Second Circuit took issue with 
Shearson’s lack of diligence in bringing the change to the lower court’s 
attention.222  So despite the increase in potential liability, the court held 
that Shearson could not bring these changes as a basis for reviving its right 
to arbitrate on appeal for the first time.223 
Litigants may also be unable to rely on amended claims that increase 
exposure when the heightened liability is foreseeable or implied.  In 
Sempra Energy Resources v. California Department of Water 
Resources,224 the original complaint only sought damages as a remedy for 
its breach-of-contract claim, but the amended complaint also asked for 
restitution and rescission of the contract.225  Viewing the original pleading 
as a whole, the California Court of Appeals noted that the Department 
sought rescission of the underlying agreement in the original complaint.226  
And the court determined that, though the Department did not explicitly 
mention restitution in the original complaint, it was implied in the request 
for rescission.227  Therefore, the change did not satisfy the “unforeseeable” 
factor. 
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B. Revival Via Change in Law: When “Futility” May Prevent Waiver 
Resulting From the Failure to Move to Compel Arbitration When the 
Existing Law Was Hostile to It 
Revival of a right to compel arbitration following waiver is commonly 
discussed in the context of an amended complaint that changes the stakes 
of litigation.  But that is not the only type of circumstance where revival 
(or nullification of waiver)228 manifests.  When a change in the relevant 
law transforms what previously would have been a “futile” motion to 
compel arbitration into a legally-cognizable motion, courts recognize a 
renewed right to pursue arbitration.  Specifically, initial futility combined 
with a party’s failure to make the motion does not necessarily waive a 
subsequently recognized right to arbitrate.229 
The Gilmore v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. case, mentioned 
previously, presents a nuanced fact pattern and analytical approach that 
also illustrates the change-in-law or futility concept of revival.  In Gilmore, 
the Second Circuit addressed revival, as a matter of first impression, in a 
case involving federal securities law claims and common law claims.230  
Then, on remand, the Southern District Court of New York considered the 
issue of revival only as to a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) claim after intervening U.S. Supreme Court 
law clarified that the defendant’s right to compel arbitration was no longer 
                                                          
 228.   Whether a right to compel arbitration is “revived” or “rejuvenated” following initial waiver 
or whether there was no waiver in the first place may often be a matter of semantics.  Indeed, if after 
waiver occurs, a court holds that, in fact, the waiver is nullified and the party is free to pursue 
arbitration, the end result is the same as revival—a renewed right to compel arbitration.  Even in 
jurisdictions where courts have previously relied on the concept of revival to analyze the effectiveness 
of a previous waiver, the discussion may still be cast in terms of nullification.  The Eleventh Circuit, 
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never happened in the first instance.  Collado v. J. & G. Transp., Inc., 820 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 
2016) (“We hold that J & G’s waiver through litigation of the right to arbitrate . . . does not extend to 
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should be explored in conjunction with the revival discussion.  Some courts, after all, find that an 
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construction contract.  Rather than exploring whether Sempra’s arbitration rights were revived by an 
amended complaint that asserted new claims, the court examined whether the original waiver was 
“nullified,” concluding that after six years of litigation, the waiver was not nullified by an amended 
complaint.  Id. at *10–13. 
 229.   Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1332–33 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding no waiver when 
defendants failed to file a motion to compel arbitration prior to an intervening Supreme Court decision 
permitting the arbitration of certain securities claims). 
 230.   Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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futile.231 
Initially, the Second Circuit held that the “explicit waiver” of 
arbitration in response to an original complaint prevented a defendant from 
“starting fresh” in response to the amended complaint.232  The Second 
Circuit also relied on fairness principles in support of its position.233  The 
court found that, if anything, the defendant Shearson’s actions during the 
course of litigation had been unfair to the plaintiffs.  Normally, a party 
cannot take inconsistent positions in a lawsuit by playing “fast and loose” 
with the courts.234  The appellate court was particularly disturbed by 
Shearson’s actions: Shearson’s sudden withdrawal of its motion to compel 
arbitration was, as Gilmore opined, a “tactic in a war of attrition” so as to 
“make the litigation too expensive” for Gilmore, an elderly clergyman.235 
Meanwhile, in 1987, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that 
agreements to arbitrate RICO claims were enforceable under the FAA.236  
This ruling reversed Second Circuit precedent, which until that point, held 
that RICO claims, such as those involved in Gilmore, were not 
arbitrable.237  The Supreme Court’s holding in Shearson/American 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon thus completely altered the calculus of 
Shearson’s right to compel arbitration upon remand.  Although it had 
initially withdrawn its motion to compel arbitration, in large part because 
before McMahon, the RICO claims were not arbitrable, the McMahon 
decision reflected a change in the law that implicated a potential revival of 
Shearson’s arbitration rights—even after the Second Circuit had rejected 
revival. 
So Shearson renewed its motion to compel arbitration.238  The court 
for the Southern District of New York found that the “addition of the RICO 
claim certainly add[ed] a new theory to plaintiff’s case.”239  And based on 
McMahon, the court found that “in fairness,” it should allow Shearson to 
revive its right to compel arbitration on the federal securities claim.240  It 
                                                          
 231.   Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 668 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 232.   Gilmore, 811 F.2d at 112. 
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noted that, even given Shearson’s extensive discovery practice, there was 
no waiver in the first instance because Shearson could not have reasonably 
perceived the RICO claims to have been arbitrable.241 
When an arbitration agreement is at least arguably enforceable, 
however, waiver may be appropriate even in light of a potential futility 
argument based on a change in law.  The Eighth Circuit in Southeastern 
Stud & Components, Inc. v. American Eagle Design Build Studios, LLC,242 
for example, refused to permit revival in 2009 after a litigant failed to raise 
arbitration at the outset of a contract case where the right to assert 
arbitration was at least theoretically plausible before a change in the law.243  
Southeastern Stud & Components’ action was filed in the Eastern District 
of Arkansas in June 2007, and the defendant, American Eagle Design 
Build Studio, LLC (AEDBS), for over a year, did not move to compel 
arbitration because “it did not believe it could enforce the arbitration 
agreement under Arkansas law.”244  At that time, “Arkansas law required 
mutuality of obligation within the contract’s arbitration agreement, even 
if there was sufficient mutuality within the rest of the contract.”245 
Then, after a second amended complaint, AEDBS moved to compel 
arbitration based on an unpublished 2008 decision by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.  That decision clarified 
that “Arkansas law requiring mutuality within the arbitration paragraph 
itself is preempted by the [Federal Arbitration Act] because it places the 
arbitration clause on unequal footing with other contract terms that do not 
each have to be mutual.”246  The district court denied the motion, holding 
AEDBS had waived its right to assert the arbitration provision.247 
At the Eighth Circuit, AEDBS argued it did not know it had the right 
to arbitrate until it discovered that the Enderlin decision revived that right.  
Prior to the Enderlin opinion, AEDBS urged “it believed the arbitration 
                                                          
 241.   Id. at 319.  Compare Kayne v. PaineWebber Inc., 684 F. Supp. 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(granting a motion to compel arbitration as PaineWebber’s inaction after the McMahon opinion was 
not “an unambiguous relinquishment of its contractual rights”), with Peterson v. Shearson/Am. 
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agreement was invalid because there was no mutuality of obligation.”248  
The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument because, pursuant to Supreme 
Court precedent clarifying the preemptive force of the FAA over contrary 
state law, “it should have been clear to AEDBS that the arbitration 
agreement was at least arguably enforceable because Arkansas could not 
have imposed additional requirements that applied only to arbitration 
agreements.”249  Thus, AEDBS’s attempt at revival was denied. 
1. Contemporary Approach to Futility 
Similar to the change-of-law impact in Gilmore, a significant body of 
case law pertaining to revival developed following the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.250  That 
doctrine is poised for rebirth as the contours of arbitrability are further 
refined by the Supreme Court’s May 21, 2018 decision in Epic Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis.251 
Broadly speaking, in 2011, the Supreme Court in Concepcion held that 
class-action waivers within arbitration provisions and subject to the FAA 
are enforceable.252  Specifically, Concepcion, which involved a cellular 
telephone contract, clarified for the first time that the FAA preempted state 
doctrines casting arbitration agreements as unconscionable and 
unenforceable in certain contexts. 
Thus, before Concepcion, class-action litigants in some jurisdictions 
could justifiably argue that moving to compel arbitration would be futile.  
To the extent that they waived any right to arbitrate, Concepcion either 
revived that right or nullified the original waiver.253  Several courts applied 
such reasoning.254 
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In 2006, for instance, the trial court in Phillips v. Sprint PCS, a 
consumer class action alleging misrepresentation of cellular rates, denied 
Sprint’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the provisions requiring 
class action waiver unconscionable under California’s consumer-friendly 
Discover Bank doctrine.255  Because Sprint did not appeal the decision, the 
case proceeded to litigation with the trial court certifying the plaintiff’s 
class in 2008.256  Two years later, the trial court stayed the action pending 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of Concepcion.257  And two months 
after Concepcion clarified that the FAA preempted California’s Discover 
Bank rule—resulting in a major change of law—Sprint renewed its motion 
to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted.258  The plaintiffs then 
appealed, arguing that Sprint waived any right to arbitration when it failed 
to appeal the initial order denying the motion to compel arbitration, among 
other reasons.259 
Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal held that Sprint did not 
waive its right to compel arbitration.260  The appellate court explained that 
although Sprint had a right to appeal, it “would have been futile given the 
state of law at the time.”261  And the court concluded that it would not find 
waiver because of a party’s failure to pursue a “futile” tactic.262 
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see In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 
838 F. Supp. 2d 967, 977–79 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding waiver because Toyota continued to act 
litigiously after Concepcion); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrid Brake Mktg., Sales, Practices & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (denying waiver when defendant asserted 
arbitration as an affirmative defense prior to Concepcion); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. 
Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting Concepcion invalidated the rule against class action 
waivers and previously defendants’ counsel could reasonably have believed that the arbitration clause 
containing a class-action waiver in the plaintiff’s agreement would have been unenforceable).   
 255.   Phillips v. Sprint PCS, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 277–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).  The California 
Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior Court that, the FAA notwithstanding, consumer 
arbitration agreements were unconscionable under California law—and therefore unenforceable—
when the agreements were adhesive, disputes involved modest damages, and the party with less 
bargaining power claimed a deliberate scheme to defraud.  113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), overruled 
by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 256.   Sprint PCS, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 278. 
 257.   Id. at 278. 
 258.   Id. at 278–79. 
 259.   Id. at 285. 
 260.   Id. at 277. 
 261.   Id. at 285. 
 262.   Id.  See also Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(remarking that a party need not “make all possible challenges to an existing law or risk waiving any 
rights it might have if that law is someday invalidated”). 
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Following similar logic, the district court in Brown v. TrueBlue, Inc.263 
found that the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate.  In Brown, 
the plaintiffs brought an action premised on Pennsylvania law and the 
FLSA alleging that the defendants who provided temporary staffing 
services gave employees the option to be paid by check or cash voucher.264  
If paid by voucher, the employee would receive a voucher and a pin 
number which could be redeemed for cash at cash-dispensing machines 
located in defendants’ branch offices.  Employees were charged a fee for 
use of the machines.  The plaintiffs alleged that the fees applied when 
using those machines often resulted in the employees receiving less than 
the prevailing wage.265   
 The plaintiffs moved for certification of two classes under Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and one collective action pursuant 
to the FLSA.  Shortly before the hearing on class certification, defendants 
moved to compel arbitration.266  The court concluded that Concepcion was 
indeed a game changer: 
[A]lthough the court is troubled that Defendants’ motion to compel 
arbitration was not filed until fifteen months after this action 
commenced, it is undisputed that the reason for this delay was that 
Concepcion represented a significant change in the state of the law.  
Because this intervening change in the law of this circuit excuses 
Defendants’ delay, and because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate 
prejudice, the court cannot find that Defendants waived their right to 
proceed to arbitration.267 
And, while the court did not use the term “futility,” it addressed the 
viability of filing a motion to compel before Concepcion.  It concluded 
that defendants either risked a finding of unconscionability and a refusal 
to enforce the agreement or having the court require defendants to pursue 
class arbitration.268  “The former result would have been 
unsatisfactory . . . . The latter result, for the reasons expressed in 
Concepcion, would have been intolerable.”269  What is or is not futile 
                                                          
 263.   No. 1:10–CV–0514, 2011 WL 5869773 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011). 
 264.   Id. at *1. 
 265.   Id. 
 266.   Id. 
 267.   Id. at *8. 
 268.   Id. at *7. 
 269.   Id.  For a decision finding no waiver but using the term “futility,” see In re Apple iPhone 
3G & 3GS “MMS” Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 864 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (E.D. La. 2012) (“[P]rior 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion, Apple’s Motion to Compel would have been futile as 
to the member cases transferred from districts that followed Discover Bank or an analogous rule.  
Courts have declined to find waiver when moving for arbitration would have been a futile act.”). 
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before a change in the law, however, may depend on the particular 
jurisdiction.  The Eleventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion as did 
many other courts in 2012 when it held that a motion to compel arbitration 
prior to Concepcion would not have been futile.  Thus, the waiver of the 
right to arbitrate was not revived. 
In Garcia v. Wachovia Corp.,270 customers of Wells Fargo (previously 
Wachovia) filed class actions alleging that Wells Fargo unlawfully 
charged overdraft fees on their checking accounts.271  The customer 
agreements included an arbitration provision that allowed either party to 
elect arbitration but prohibited class arbitration.272  The district court twice 
invited Wells Fargo to move for arbitration, but it declined.273  Because 
neither party asserted their arbitration rights, the parties began preparing 
for trial.274 
However, in 2011, after Concepcion, Wells Fargo moved to compel 
its right to arbitrate.275  Wells Fargo argued that, before Concepcion, it 
would have been futile to pursue its arbitration rights because state law 
prevented enforcement of class action waivers in customer agreements.276  
The district court denied the motion premised on waiver.277 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed.  It found that Wells Fargo had acted 
inconsistently with its arbitration right when it failed to elect arbitration in 
response to the district court’s invitation and participated in extensive 
discovery.278  In addition, the appellate court determined that the plaintiffs 
would suffer prejudice because, first, they had expended extensive sums 
in pursuing litigation, and, second, “Wells Fargo benefited from 
conducting discovery of the [class] plaintiffs.”279 
The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that filing a motion to compel 
arbitration before the Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision was not 
futile.280  The court noted that, absent controlling Supreme Court or circuit 
precedent foreclosing a right to arbitrate, a motion to compel will almost 
never be considered futile.281  A motion that is merely “unlikely to 
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succeed” is not futile, but rather only when it is “almost certain” to fail.282 
2. The Next Frontier of “Revival”? 
The application of revival of the right to arbitrate in the futility context 
may be further defined following the Supreme Court’s May 2018 decision 
in three consolidated cases.283  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court 
analyzed whether arbitration agreements with class and collective waivers 
are enforceable under the FAA, irrespective of the National Labor 
Relations Board’s interpretation that such agreements violate employee 
rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).284 
In May 2016, the Seventh Circuit created a circuit split with its 
decision in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.,285 which held that an arbitration 
agreement precluding collective arbitration or collective action violates 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act286 and is unenforceable 
under the FAA.287  That put the Seventh Circuit squarely at odds with the 
Fifth, Second, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits which had previously held that 
the FAA’s policy of favoring arbitration overrides any concerted activity 
rights employees have to class or collective remedies.288  Subsequently, 
the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit and held in Morris v. Ernst & 
Young, LLP289 that despite the FAA, under Section 7, employees have 
substantive rights to pursue collective relief that cannot be waived in an 
arbitration agreement.  Meanwhile, the NLRB sought certiorari in the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB that Section 7 rights 
did not override the FAA’s arbitration enforcement command.290 
In January 2017, the Court granted certiorari in all three cases and 
consolidated them to review the scope of its Concepcion holding.291  
                                                          
 282.   Id. at 1279. 
 283.   See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 284.   Id. at 1620–21. 
 285.   823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
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 287.   9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
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 290.   Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 
809 (2017). 
 291.   Indeed, in the Sixth Circuit, for instance, following the grant of certiorari in the consolidated 
cases, it could be considered as futile to seek to compel individual arbitration of an employment 
dispute.  In NLRB v. Alternative Entertainment, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) the Sixth Circuit 
majority joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that an arbitration agreement requiring 
employees to individually arbitrate their claims violates the NLRA’s protection of the right to engage 
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Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the NLRA does 
not contain a class action right that trumps the FAA: 
The NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain 
collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must 
try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or 
arbitral forum.  This Court has never read a right to class actions into the 
NLRA—and for three quarters of a century neither did the National 
Labor Relations Board.  Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the 
NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither 
permits this Court to declare the parties’ agreements unlawful.292 
Additionally, Justice Gorsuch rejected the employees’ argument that 
the NLRA contained a congressional command to displace the FAA 
insofar as it concerned individual employment arbitration agreements.  
Section 7, however, “does not express approval or disapproval of 
arbitration.  It does not mention class or collective action procedures.  It 
does not even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone 
accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents 
demand.”293 
Fundamentally, the majority opinion in Epic Systems was correct.  
Congress did not establish a right to bring collective or class legal claims 
within the NLRA in 1935.  And no interpretations by the contemporary 
National Labor Relations Board changed that.  Eventually, Congress did 
provide a procedural path to collective actions with the 1938 passage of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and its 1947 amendments, which were 
necessary because such rights did not previously exist.  All of this was 
clarified in Epic Systems, which sorted out the confusion presented by the 
consolidated cases. 
Following Epic Systems, the question arises particularly in the Sixth, 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits as to whether employers, during the pendency 
of Epic Systems, waived their ability to compel arbitration when they did 
not do so originally.  Courts within those circuits may be forced to confront 
anew the futility of previously seeking arbitration, affixing new gloss on 
the varying standards for determining “futility” so as to permit arbitration 
based on a change of law. 
Moreover, because of the differing approaches to waiver throughout 
the country, a detailed analysis would still be necessary in any given case 
regarding whether a right to arbitrate was truly waived in the first place. 
                                                          
in concerted activity, which includes a guaranteed right to pursue collective action. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When does a party waive its right to compel arbitration?  And how 
does the presence—or lack thereof—of unnamed putative class members 
in a class action impact the waiver analysis?  As this article has shown, 
finding the answers to those questions requires navigating a labyrinth of 
legal tests that differ from one jurisdiction to the next.  And the historic 
basis of waiver or “default” adds few analytical tools.  The lack of 
uniformity injects uncertainty into the legal system regardless of the type 
of claim.  All sectors of litigation, from employment to products liability 
to antitrust to financial services, are ill-served by the differing rules that 
apply in different courthouses. 
The same confusion persists when courts try to analyze whether a 
party’s right to arbitrate—once waived—has been revived.  Just as with 
the initial waiver analysis, this inconsistency is particularly problematic in 
the class action context where significant cost and risk are routinely at 
stake. 
Uniformity is long overdue.  Namely in the class and aggregate 
litigation arena, consistent approaches to waiver would help litigants 
understand courts’ authority and jurisdiction regarding absent class 
member rights as well as the impact of litigation strategies designed to 
raise arbitration defenses at the class certification stage—but not before.  
Clear rules on revival would also inject greater fairness into the legal 
system.  To be sure, however, class-action litigants should not be forced 
into a waiver dilemma involving theoretical claims of class members not 
yet before the court.  In the interest of clarity and fairness, prior to class 
certification, there should be no need for a waiver analysis to occur with 
respect to putative class members.  That is, if it is not ripe for a defendant 
to move to compel arbitration because a putative class member is not yet 
before the court, then the same logic should apply to waiver: it is not ripe 
to make a waiver determination before an absent class member is in the 
case through the certification mechanism. 
A call for uniformity is not to say that the waiver analysis should 
always be the same.  The facts of a particular case often do—and should—
control.  But the rules that govern waiver and revival of arbitration rights 
should not be so inconsistent and forum-dependent.  Greater, if not total, 
clarity would be a welcome development and aid not only the parties but 
also the courts called upon to decide these issues.  Indeed, more than a 
judge’s reaction to a parties’ litigation-related conduct in a particular case 
is needed.  Instead, uniform standards that directly relate to the court’s 
jurisdiction, pleading requirements or to the procedural rules relating to 
aggregate litigation would greatly enhance the process. 
